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Abstract 
 
 
 In various mass media sources and international reports was mentioned influence of 
someone else in Osh conflict 2010. Actually, Kyrgyz nationalism has played a crucial role in 
June collisions in Osh between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It‘s remarkable that suffered Uzbek side 
was also active in actions for obtaining autonomy in the same region after the coup. The 
problem also was aggravated with existence of just resource problem. Exactly 20 years ago, 
in 1990, first Osh conflict flashed because of lands lack. Now the problem was in water and  
disastrous economic situation in the south of Kyrgyzstan. On belief of many, kindle a fire of 
interethnic riots in Central Asia could benefit Russian authorities in order to win time after 
the overthrown of Bakiyev. In fact, there wasn't need any special help for increasing tensions 
in region in period of governmental vacuum. Russia‘s influence, cooperation and impact on 
Osh events by means of Kyrgyz nationalism will be considered through a prism of ethno – 
symbolism approach.  
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Introduction 
 
The Osh conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks repeated again exactly in 20 years in 
June 2010. The reasons of mass bloody collisions were not only interethnic, but coming out 
more from national, even nationalistic and socio-economic factors. They created great tension 
in relations of two ethnic groups, which was obviously convex in compare to other ethnic 
relationship of Central Asian states.
1
 Analyzing and considering materials and sources on this 
subject it became impossible to exclude influence of foreign power from outside, which have 
impact on course of riots. Many events and their reasons are indicators in themselves of 
ambiguity and strange discrepancy that causes huge number of questions.  
 
Historically main actor in Central Asia was Russia. Actually, roots of the Osh conflict 
go deeply in times of colonial policy of Tsar Russia. Then, formed USSR remade existing 
map and drew new borders. As a result of that some ethnic gropus appeared in the territory of 
two states at once or just outside of their natural borders. This big problem of the region is 
well reflected through in a micro issue of one region of a certain state – in this case it's Osh of 
Kyrgyzstan. The main goal of this work is detection of Russia's foreign policy in this conflict 
and its impact on course of the events which have led to Osh conflict. There is a certain 
collection of reasons and factors which have been used as tools for influence or pressure from 
the former metropole.  
 
First chapter is about a way, which has passed Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after 
collapse of USSR
2
. The main emphasis is placed on their relationship and partnership with 
Russia. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan rushed between pro-Russian and pro-Western 
oriented organizations without fixed opportunity to choose one: it was entering and then 
leaving organizations. Owing to its relative wealth of resources, Uzbekistan could allow itself 
such policy, but Kyrgyzstan entirely depended on Russia in all spheres. Everything changed 
after 2000 when in Central Asia amplified influence of the USA, which began to restrict 
influence of Moscow in two Central Asian States. For counteraction to terrorism coming 
                                                 
1
Stuart J. Kaufman, ―Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme 
Ethnic Violence‖, International Security, Vol. 30(4), (2001): 17 
2
Rajan Menon, ―In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia‖,International Security, Vol. 20(1), (1995): 156 
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from Afghanistan the USA rents bases in Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad) and in Kyrgyzstan 
(Manas). In result a unique situation occurred inKyrgyzstan, where situated at once two 
bases: American and Russian called Kant. Such difficult political situation promised to 
Kyrgyzstan future difficulties.The president of Uzbekistan under the pretext of beingthe 
guarantor of security in the region suppressed antigovernment protests meanwhile.
3
 
 
Further there is analysis of resources and opportunities of two countries and their use 
in a game of politics. Kyrgyzstan has no natural resources, but there are great stocks of water. 
Water in Central Asia means a lot, asacute shortage of water is felt and therefore its existence 
is put on one place with presence of natural gas or cotton. It‘s even called blue gold.4Despite 
existence of one of the biggest water reservoirs of Central Asia, Toktogul, the Osh area 
suffered from lack of water.The closest river Ak-Bura constantly neededcleaning because of 
mud streams that made its water dull. Struggle for resources in Osh region already was a 
potential threat for peace and stability. The similar reason plus land division issue provoked 
the first Osh conflict in 1990. 
 
In the subsequent two chaptersattention is paid to rising nationalism, generally 
Kyrgyz, which was directed actually against all non-Kyrgyz in country. Growth of nationalist 
sentiments together with poverty and huge social and economic problems has already 
prepared soil for the future conflict. Kyrgyz tried to find their place in history;they addressed 
to their traditions and ancient cult.
5
The Uzbek nationalism rose in counterbalance to an 
existing regime. Appeared personalities, trying to realize their national Uzbek projects out of 
Uzbekistan.However, intensity was only oral: in words and in mass media, but don‘t turn into 
                                                 
3
Reuel R. Hanks, Global Security Watch: Central Asia (CA, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2010): 142 
4
Ibid., 73 
5
 Matt Siegel, ―In Kyrgyzstan Nationalism Rises from the Ashes‖, Daily Times, August 26, 
2010 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C08%5C26%5Cstory_26-8-
2010_pg20_9 
  
 
 
physical opposition.
6
 At that time in Kyrgyzstan Tulip revolution took place and new 
president Kurmanbek Bakiyev promised changes to the best. 
 
Soon Bakiyev became objectionable for Russia, as he didn‘tkeep his promise to close 
for Americans base Manas. In Russian mass media rose anti-Bakiyev wave.Also internal 
discontent with him undermined Bakiyev‘s reputation. Split in Kyrgyzstan between South 
and North grew: there were his supporters in the South and opponents in the North. In fact, it 
was a good moment for management for the third side; at the same time in the South in Osh 
an Uzbek movement rose, which demanded for itself self-regulated autonomy.   
 
Soon events stretched one after another in a chain: Bakiyev's overthrow andthen 
anarchy, establishment of Interim Government and, finally, violence explosion: Osh riots.The 
Osh riotscaused much doubt, suspicions and simply questions as occurred spontaneously and 
violently.  They became continuation of April events. Division to North and South and also 
subsequent division of certain region residents into Kyrgyz and Uzbeks can be considered in 
a context of ethno-symbolism. This ideacould be used for influence deduction in two statesat 
once. An actor, which deepens distinctions between two warring sides, becomes the general 
denominator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Daniil Kislov, ―Kirgizy i Uzbeki nikogda ne Otkryli by Drug na Druga Ogon, Esli by ni 
Provokaciya‖ [The Kyrgyz and Uzbeks Would Never Have Opened Fire against Each Other, 
Unless a Provocation] Radio France Internationale, May 2, 2012 
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Chapter I. Policy of Russia and the USA in Central Asia during the post-Soviet period. 
 
 § 1.1 Uzbekistan in international political arena. 
 
 Relationship between two countries - Russia and Uzbekistan gained very spasmodic 
character with beginning of post-Soviet period at once. Despite statements of full readiness to 
cooperate and be ally of Russia Uzbekistan sought to provide its own policy at which it could 
construct lines of cooperation with the West, the USA,  Russia and other regional neighbors 
as well. But such multivector policy for the newly appeared state couldn't allow it to 
concentrate on specific objectives for maintaining a certain political course and stay part from 
conflict issues of Central Asia. Thus, maneuvering in a choice of close partners went by 
Uzbekistan in a zigzag way. It can be revealed more obviously from a membership history of 
Uzbekistan in the international governmental organizations, such as CSTO (Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation) and GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)
7,8
 
 
 Both CSTO and GUAM are two absolutely different and opposite organizations in 
their foreign policy orientation. Actually, GUAM was created for a counterbalance to CSTO 
in 1997. Just the main divergence in their positions is attitude toward relations and close 
cooperation with Russia. In this case in pursued policy of the president of Uzbekistan since 
1990 Islam Karimov are noticeable change of allies on a certain period of time and after 
return to previous one again.
9
 During the period from 1992 till 1999 Uzbekistan participated 
in CSTO and was ally of the Russian Federation at that time.  
 
                                                 
7
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, o.w. http://odkb-csto.org 
8
GUAM, Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, o.w.  
http://guam-organization.org 
9
Islam Karimov, Uzbekskiy narod nikoqda i ni ot kogo ne budet zaviset [Uzbek nation will 
never depend from anyone] Vol. XIII (Тashkent:Uzbekiston, 2005), 45  
  
 
 
Two largest states of Central Asia - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were quite enough for 
being of CA in the field of Russia's influence. Uzbekistan was keen on bilateral defence 
cooperation with Russia; agreements in May 1992 and March 1994, when I.  Karimov began 
to refer to Russian ―imperialistic‖ ambitions, these treaties appear to have lapsed or remained 
merely blueprints.
10
That's why Uzbekistan was treated very watchfully in CSTO.  
 
Such conclusion can be drawn out on the basis of various Russian political experts 
opinions after Uzbekistan‘s escape from CSTO. The head of the Russian Institute of strategic 
estimates Alexander Konovalov: ―Uzbekistan always was ―a problem country‖ for CSTO. 
Uzbekistan disagreed with estimates from abroad which became concerning its domestic 
policy, sometimes happened that Uzbekistan don't want to incur the expenses related to 
membership in this organization, to carry out together some doctrines, to delegate its  own 
divisions for joint forces of CSTO. Uzbekistan always was ―a cat walking by its own 
way.‖11It was an appeal to Uzbekistan leaving CSTO already for the second time in 2012.  
 
But there was one event, which changed prospects of development of relations of 
Uzbekistan and Russia before Uzbekistan‘s exit from CSTO and its immediate accession to 
GUAM. Appeared a political triangle where the third party was the USA.
12
 
 
On February 16, 1999 occurred a bloody act of terrorism in Tashkent: six explosions 
happened in the central part of the city one by one. As a result 16 people were killed and 
more than 100 wounded. Islam Karimov right there condemned this act of terrorism having 
called it work of Islamists who want to destabilize situation in the country and to move him 
away personally.Right there began mass arrests over all country of those who was anyway 
suspected of connections with various pro-Islamic movements.
13
 Juma Namangani and 
Takhir Yuldashev were immediately accused. Uzbekistan closed its border with Tajikistan 
                                                 
10
Rajan Menon, Yuri Fedorov and Ghia Nodia, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the 
21
st 
centruy Security Environment ( New York, Armonk: EastWest Institute, 1999), 34 
11  Tatiyana Zamakhina, Uzbekistan uxodit iz ―SNGshnogo‖ NATO [Uzbekistan leaves 
NATO of ―CIS‖],Moskovskiy Komsomolets RU, June 28, 2012 
12
Roman Muzalevskiy, “Russia‘s Strategy in Central Asia: An Analysis of Key Trends‖, Yale 
Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2009): 28 
13
Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia, 1
st 
ed (New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 54 
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alleging a Tajik connection to the bombings.
14
These explosions in Tashkent responded as an 
echo not only in the Uzbekistan, but also beyond its borders.  
According to opinion of the independent Uzbek experts living out of Uzbekistan these 
acts of terrorism were provoked specially by state‘s government for disposal of objectionable 
oppositionists, as there was a risk government change by revolution.However, the official 
version was that ―Hizb Ut-Tahrir‖ group prepared these explosions. Further actions of Uzbek 
government showed what happened in Tashkent also helped for balancing of in a sheaf 
Uzbekistan - Russia.But the version of preparation terror act in Tashkent by Islamic radicals 
nevertheless was more confirmed, as members of the organization didn't hide the long-term 
plans and were open in fight for establishment of Shariah on all territory of Uzbekistan and 
after all in Central Asia. Therefore alternative versions about preparation of act of terrorism 
by other forces remained only unconfirmed guesses.Many citizens of Uzbekistan supported I. 
Karimov‘s preventive actions of the establishment of radical Islamic groups and 
identification of all participants of them. 
 
With all that Uzbekistan had an obvious danger from Afghanistan - penetration and 
distribution of radical Islamic movements on its territory.
15
 It was necessary to get serious 
support for resisting them. Uzbekistan assumed long ago to stay apart from the Russian 
course of policy and now there was a convenient case to establish new coil of relations with 
the USA.
16
 So, in April 1999 Uzbekistan was included into GUAM and became its full 
member.Parallel to this were developing relations and joint cooperation in the safety sphere 
in the region with the USA.  
 
Relations with Russia became cooled and two states participate in common economic 
projects. But very soon Uzbekistan became a member of SCO, as many experts think, owing 
to its geopolitical circumstances.
17
 Despite accession to SCO a military base located in 
Karshy-Khanabad, in the south of Uzbekistan, was given fro use to the USA troops. 
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Ibid., 55 
15
Vitaly Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 225 
16
Rajan Menon et al., op.cit, p. 68 
17
Eugene Rumer et al., Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing (New 
York, Armonk, M.E.Sharpe, 2007), 36 
  
 
 
Certainly, such act puzzled politicians of the Kremlin. But for Uzbekistan itself the period 
from 2001 to 2005 passed under skillful maneuvering between different powers in the region. 
According to I. Karimov, Uzbekistan, finally, was forming its own independent and 
sovereign way of progress.
18
 
 
But year of 2005 literally stirred up Central Asia. In the Uzbek Andijan escalated a 
huge unrest, which was suppressed so cruelly that those events entered into history under the 
name of the Andijan massacre.
19
 In neighbor Kyrgyzstan a revolution took place and 
presidentA.Akayev was governing the country for the last days of his presidency. Many 
articles of newspapers and journals dazzled with headings that Central Asia gets rid of freight 
of the communistic-Soviet remnants and begins a new era without the former Komsomols. 
 
The Russian press showed the indignation concerning ease and simplicity of situation 
correction together by West and the USA in the region, trying to provoke escalations 
artificially.The head of state I. Karimov called again Hizb Ut-Tahrir organization guilty in 
preparing the Andijan unrest and promised to fight against any manifestation of religious 
extremism.
20
Everything was repeated exactly as it was once n Tashkent terroristic act. But 
many residents of Central Asia states considered that Andijan events were just a clan race for 
gaining governance and attempt to organize revolution in Uzbekistan like it happened in 
Kyrgyzstan.   
 
I. Karimov covered Andijan massacre with a label of extremism in order to be able to 
eliminate from affairs of the opponents under the name of struggle against rebels. In many 
sources according to Andijan tragedy very often were mentioned bloody and mass massacres 
                                                 
18
 Islam Karimov, Nasha visshaya tsel – nezavisimost i protsvetanie Rodini, svoboda i 
blaqopoluchie naroda [Our prime aim is independence and prosperity of Homeland, freedom 
and well-being of the nation] Vol. VIII, (Ташкент: Узбекистон, 2005), 78 
19 ―How the Andijan killings unfolded‖,BBC News/Asia-Pacific/, May 17 2005 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4550845.stm  
20
 Ekaterina Kubovskaya, ―Posle Andijana budet tolko Andijan‖ [After Andijan it will be 
again Andijan], Pervaya Krimskaya,№74, May 26, 2005 
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over participants.
21
 Andijan, in fact, became one more starting point in development of the 
relations between Uzbekistan about Russia - interests of two heads of states concerning 
deduction of the political power and suppression of protests exactly met here.These actions of 
the president had quite weighty reasons for him. Akram Yuldash and his followers, which 
were called ―akramists‖, applied for change in Uzbek government.22 
 
Akram Yuldash was a new figure in political life of Uzbekistan,he openly declared 
the pro-Islamic ideology of his organization and tried to build a certain oppositional line with 
his supporters to the incumbent president. But, besides all this, it is impossible to speak about 
exact reliable information as the opinions received from various sources differ and provide 
absolutely opposite versions, which is out of wonder, considering bias or involvement of 
various information sources. In many aspects opinions of Central Asian residents were 
similar that presenting in region fundamental Islamic factor at Andijhan is true and also that 
mutiny were financed from the outside.
23
 
 
The USA and the European countries sharply scarified actions of the Uzbek 
authorities against protesters and even entered sanctions against Uzbekistan.
24
For president 
Karimov it was something like a signal for changes in state. In Uzbek political elite rose a 
question of how expedient was to continue close cooperation with the USA, which will 
promote changes in a country mode sooner or later. It is possible that harsh change of 
political guideline of Uzbekistan happened because of above-mentioned events.  
 
Uzbekistan not only again entered CSTO, but also became a member of Eurasian 
Economic Community (EAEC). Eurasian Economic Community or EurAsEs often is called 
                                                 
21―Bullets were falling like rain. The Andijan Massacre‖ May13, 2005, Vol. 17, No.5 (D), 
Report of Human Rights Watch, 2005 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/ 
22―Yuldashev otdaval prikazi o zakhvate vlastnix struktur v Andijane‖ [Yuldashev was giving 
orders to capture government organs in Andijan], RIA “Novosti”, Institure of Religion and 
Politics, October 19, 2005 http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-1201.html 
23
Lena Jonson, op.cit, p. 56 
24―EU to discuss future of sanctions against Uzbekistan over Andijan massacre‖, Uznews, 
October 13, 2007 http://www.uznews.net/news_single.php?lng=en&cid=31&nid=1218 
  
 
 
an organization of Moscow‘s attempt to revive the Soviet Union.25 Many positions in it fix 
the uniform customs duties and export tax tariffs for participants: a peculiar policy of an 
economic binding. Also member states of this organization closely cooperate practically in all 
scopes. But membership of Uzbekistanin this organization also was short-lived; it left it in 
2008.
26
 
 
The second stage of flexible policy between allies - Russia on the one hand and both 
the West and the USA on the other hand - began. The policy of the Kremlin in every possible 
way sought to promote rapprochement with president Karimov as Uzbekistan was some kind 
of buffer zone between Russia and Afghanistan. American troops were deployed in 
Afghanistan, so there was a possibility of recapture to Karshy-Khanabad.
27
 According to 
local Uzbek and Central Asian sources, Uzbekistan decided to follow a way of golden mean, 
trying not to give any shift to one of the sides. Uzbekistan‘s maneuvers on the international 
arena should not all be reduced to a game of choice between the West and Russia.  
 
China plays an equally important role in the foreign policy of Tashkent. For Beijing, 
the one-way intensification of U.S. policy in Central Asia is as disadvantageous as Russia‘s 
absolute domination over the region.
28
Thus, Uzbekistan is compelled to reckon with a 
triangle of foreign powers, which are present in the region. 
 
 
§ 1.2 Russian – Kyrgyz - American interrelations. 
 
 Kyrgyzstan is a small poor country located at the intersection of geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests of three superpowers - China, Russia and the USA. As well as the 
neighboring Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the country which has no influence on global processes 
                                                 
25
Boris Rumer, Stanislav Zhukov, Central Asia, The Challenges of Independence (New York, 
Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1998), 21 
26
Eurasian Economic Community o.w. http://www.evrazes.com/ 
27
Neil J. Melvin, Bhavna Dave, Engaging Central Asia: The European Union’s New Strategy 
in the Heart of Eurasia (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008) 380 
28
Sergey Markedonov, ―Uzbekistan: The End of a Multi-vector Foreign Policy?”Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2012 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and which throughout post-Soviet time solves problems of building of the statehood basically 
at the expense of external donors.
29
This short and capacious definition given to Kyrgyzstan 
by the Russian professor of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University directly indicates germs of 
future conflicts. Difficult economic situation within the country and absence or quite small 
quantity of resources, minerals and also goods for export does the country unattractive in 
comparison with its rich neighbors in this aspect.  
 
But existence of the internal conflicts, both ethnic and regional and social class 
dismantling as well makes Kyrgyzstan even more vulnerable. All this forces to look for more 
favorable and useful ally not only in the region, but also beyond it. 
 
It should be noted that after collapse of the Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan was one of the 
most loyal states among others towards foreign policy of Russia. First, mutual economic and 
trade cooperation between two countriesplayed a favorable role.  
 
Secondly, the huge percent of the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the 
large administrative and industrial cities also had a big influence as Russians occupied the 
most considerable part of state positions.
30,31
 
 
Thirdly, there are contracts on close military cooperation and presence of the Russian 
armies on territories of Kyrgyzstan and also placement of military facilities of one state on 
the territory of another, preservation of developed military communications and production, 
sharing of military ranges and training centers and supply of arms, military equipment and 
                                                 
29
Alexander Knyazev, Kyrgyzstan and Russia: Security, Cooperation and Development 
perspectives in the Central Asian region, (Bishkek: Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, 
2008),3 
30
 Elena Yarkova, ―Russkie v Kirgizii: Sotsiokulturnaya dinamika mejetnicheskix 
otnosheniy‖ [Russians in Kyrgyzstan: Social and cultural dynamics of interethnic 
relationship], Obshestvennie Nauki I Sovremennost, No 5 (1999) : 107 
31
 Bulat Sarygulov, Izmenenie etnicheskogo sostava naseleniya [Change of ethnic 
componenet of population] In Naselenie Kyrgyzstana v nachale XXI veka [Population of 
Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of XXI century]ed. M. Denisenko (YUNFPA, Bishkek, 2011), 82 
  
 
 
other appliances.
32
 Participating in CSTO, SCO and EurAsEs reflects priorities of state‘s 
political orientation.One of key factors in cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia was 
opening of an air base in Kant. Soon Russian troops were allocated there. On October 23, 
2003 President Vladimir Putin participated personally at opening ceremony in Kant.In the 
same day some agreements concerning close military mutual cooperation were signed. 
Kyrgyzstan became tightly attached to Russia not only by obligations of participating in 
regional organizations but also directly as a state drawn by economic and military bonds.
33
 
 
Here was obviously visible that political relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan 
were constructing easier and smoother than in Russia-Uzbekistan sheaf. Such regional status 
of Kyrgyzstan gave another international actors more maneuvers for actions in Central Asia. 
The situation in Kyrgyzstan, unstable in whole because of many internal factors, could be 
used for political pressure upon neighboring countries. States like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
with which Kyrgyzstan had unsolved boundary problems could be a target of regional and 
international influence of powers like Russia, the USA and China.  
 
The USA also made an attempt to improve and develop closer American-Kyrgyz 
relations after opening ―Kant‖ air base. 34 Even participation of Kyrgyzstan in NATO 
programs like "Partnership for Peace" played very insignificant role in the USA-Kyrgyzstan 
affairs; despite American and Kyrgyz military have conducted joint bilateral and multilateral 
military exercises. The National Guard of Kyrgyzstan has conducted joint military exercises 
in Montana with the National Guard of this state, during which they shared expertise in 
conducting military actions in mountainous areas. 
35
 Domination of the Kremlin policy in 
Kyrgyz international relations with other states was available. But it‘s impossible to say that 
                                                 
32
 Rossiysko-kirguzskoe voennoe i voenno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo [Russian-Kyrgyz 
military and military-techniсal cooperation] Embassy of RF in Kyrgyz Republic,  o.w. 
http://www.kyrgyz.mid.ru/vivtc.html 
33
Alexander Knyazev, op.cit, 5 
34―U.S. Relations with Kyrgyzstan‖, Fact Sheet, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 
November 16, 2012 
35
Baktybek Abdrisaev, US-Kyrgyz Strategic Cooperation, Lecture №760, The Heritage 
Foundation, June 18, 2002 
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Kyrgyzstan accepted this way of partnership without doubts.
36
 It had no other choice except 
agreement with regional requirements that have been put by Russia. But Kyrgyzstan managed 
to make attempts for improving relations with the USA. These discussions were far going, 
even dispute about military cooperation was held. It specifies Kyrgyzstan as a state trying to 
keep in touch with other actors as well as Uzbekistan, and despite its complicated situation to 
expose the multi-vector line of foreign policy.  
 
The offer of the USA to use ―Manas‖ air base put a new turn Kyrgyz-American 
interrelations. The USA needed to get support from states of the region during operations in 
Afghanistan after events of September 11, 2001. Representatives of Kyrgyzstan coordinated 
the decision on granting ―Manas‖ air base to American troops at SCO and SCTO meetings.37 
Thus, ―Manas‖ air base became a dislocation of the American military forces in Kyrgyzstan. 
Quite interesting case turned out in global politics: military bases of the USA and Russia 
were settled down on the territory of one country in close proximity from each other.  
 
On one hand, it proved flexibility of the policy pursued by the Kyrgyz government. 
But on another hand, many experts were afraid that sooner or later any conflict could develop 
from this non-understandable situation. Certainly, times of cold war passed for a long time 
and now there was no opinion concerning conflict escalation because of influence zones 
between Russia and the USA.
38
 Considering a number of problems in Kyrgyzstan‘s social, 
economic and political life it was possible to tell that standing of different political orientated 
states‘ troops only aggravated the provision of the latent conflicts and warmed up future 
uncertainty in questions of regional development.   
 
After revolution of 2005 when Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to the power relations and 
cooperation between the USA and Kyrgyzstan sharply grew cold. First of all, it was 
expressed in a question of stay term extension of American troops at ―Manas‖. So, from July 
                                                 
36
 Aleksandr Kim, ―Kto zashitit bezopasnost' Kyrgyzstana: SSHA ili Rossiya‖ [Who will 
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2005 to July 2006 the status of the Manas, U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan, became a central 
issue in U.S.-Kyrgyz relations and within Kyrgyz domestic politics.
39
 
 
Bakiyev as pro-Russian focused politician tried to resolve this issue with the help of 
price increase that has to be bring leave air base by Americans. But the USA policymakers 
were interested in preservation troops at this air base more than ever. Donald Ramsfeld, 
Minister of Defence of the USA, personally visited Bishkek for this purpose.Soon with 
similar visit to Bishkek arrived the US Secretary of State- Condoleezza Rice.
40
 All this 
weakened efforts of Russia on complete control and allied cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. It 
should be noted that here Russia wasn't more the only player in the region. There was a 
considerable setof projects modeling of regional or ideological integration in which 
Kyrgyzstan was involved.  
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Chapter II. The reasons, which preceded to the Osh conflict. 
 
§ 2.1 First Osh conflict as fight for social inequality between Uzbek and Kyrgyz people. 
 
 It‘s worth to pay close attention to the Osh conflict of 1990,which preceded to the Osh 
conflict of 2010. The second conflict went back to the first escalation in Osh region, where 
unrest began. The Osh conflict in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1990 was one of the largest 
and most violent riot-type conflicts on the territory of the former USSR.
41
If to consider 
conflict directly between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan then to the forefront came out actions of 
certain groups or organizations of these states. There was an association "Osh Ajmagy" 
(means ―Osh Region‖) in Kyrgyzstan, which provided interests of Kyrgyz residents of Osh. 
From the Uzbek side the public organization "Adolat" was protectinginterest of Uzbek 
population living in Osh.
42
 In this case apple of discord between two nations was sharing of 
land sectors for infrastructure. This question couldn‘t be solved peacefully and very soon 
expanded to scale of slaughter. 
 
 The end of ‘89 and beginning of the ‘90 was marked by splash of Kyrgyz nationalist 
movements not only in Osh but also over all country. Collisions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz and Russians as well happenedin Jalal-Abad and Uzgen cities. But worst of all 
protests were in Osh. There was a sharp problem of lands shortage. This task, which had to 
be solved by officials and representatives of government, remained a big problem throughout 
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long time. Kyrgyz were very dissatisfied with that their requirements remained without any 
answer.
43
 
 
They tried to allocate for themselves some parts of Osh land for buildings. The 
association ―Osh Ajmagy‖ was the main initiator of it. About 5 thousand Kyrgyz gather for 
meeting on the territory of high school №38 in collective farm named after Lenin on May 
27.
44
 Head chiefs of the Osh area also arrived there. Chairman of regional executive 
committee declares that 32 hectares of cotton fields would be allocated for buildings to 
Kyrgyz residents. However, according to Uzbek residents and eyewitnesses everything didn't 
occur so peacefully. Gathered for meeting Kyrgyz protesters behaved extremely aggressively 
and tried to attack Uzbeks.  
 
There were numerous skirmishes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek population of Osh 
on the same day.Uzbeks were very dissatisfied with such progressing situation in Osh. 
"Kyrgyz came here from mountains: today they seized our earth and tomorrow will expel us 
from our own houses" – such opinions spread quickly among Uzbeks. 45  According to 
Shavkat Rahmon, Uzbek writer and public figure of Uzbekistan, who researched first Osh 
conflict in details, representatives of Kyrgyz government behaved extremely careless in this 
situation. Many people of the Uzbek community of Osh waited for resolute actions from 
Kyrgyz officials,which would condemn impudent behavior of ―Osh Ajmagy‖union. At the 
same time among the Kyrgyz population began to spread rumors about Uzbeks considering 
them alien robbers of lands. This entire startled situation even more.  
 
The secretary of regional party committee Usen Saddykov more than the others 
kindled international discord, trying to show, in fact,domestic conflict as an interethnic 
collision. Many considered that he was providing policy of Zhumagulovright there in 
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Osh.
46
Zhumagulov was a chairman of Board of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and had power to 
ask chairman of collective farming of Osh to sign the decree about allocation of land grounds 
for Kyrgyz.  
 
But this assignment had to pass a row of various bureaucratic procedures and only to 
be approved. But officials weren‘t in a hurry with answer; meanwhile conflict of Osh 
population already started becoming ripe. 
 But Kyrgyz had their own version of these events. According to major of Osh of that 
time, Melis Myrzakmatov, a conflictness was proceeded from the Uzbek side and, if to be 
more exact, from Uzbek separatists, living in Osh.
47
 
 
The Uzbek population of Osh was involved in all spheres of activity in the region: 
Uzbeks held state positions, had cultural centers, own living massives, were engaged in 
business and economy. Various sport and cultural events were arranged together by Kyrgyz 
and Uzbeks. No discrimination could been seem in Osh toward Uzbek minority. But created 
in Uzbekistan "Adolat" association, that means justice, gathered under its idea many 
extremely radical Uzbek nationalists.
48
 Certainly, right there appeared leaders and spiritual 
ideologists of this organization - Kadyrzhan Batyrov and Inomzhan Abdurasulov. 
Subsequently their names will incline in mass media even much after Osh events.  
 
Batyrov, which was a businessman at that time then would lead ―Vatan‖ party.49 
Members of ―Adolat‖ were among the first reacted to the statement of the Kyrgyz society 
―Osh Ajmagy‖ about granting lands of collective farming community  to them for building 
houses. To support  Osh Uzbeks ―Adolat‖  also organized meeting on certain date in order to 
meet with Kyrgyz demanders.
50
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It should be noted that officials from both sides didn't try to affect seriously on current 
situation somehow. It was obvious that the situation was heating and becoming critical and 
after its peak it would be hardly possible to avoid collisions between two sides. This opinion 
is shared both by Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides. Both sides are sure now that if there was a timely 
intervention in affairs of communities and a quick solution then could be avoided growth of 
problem to huge scales.
51
 The atmosphere in the cities of Osh was noticeably heated. Uzbeks 
started refusing housing hiring to Kyrgyz, therefore more than 1500 Kyrgyz lodgers that were 
living on private apartments at Uzbeks were on the street. These houseless lodgers  filled up 
rows of those who demand allocation of the land ground.  
 
Kyrgyz in a categorical form demanded from the authorities to give them the final 
answer about granting lands.
52
 Uzbeks also waited for the final answer concerning lands. 
There was put a concrete date: 4
th
 of June.  Much before 4
th
 of June many people already 
assumed that this day wouldn't pass just like others. Tensions were too high.  
 
Rumors and unchecked information also added oil in fire and promoted growth of 
hostility.Some claim that Kyrgyz and Uzbeks prepared for a showdown on a protest place 
before that date. Kyrgyz protesters who considered themselves offended on their own land in 
Osh region of Kyrgyzstan were showing special activity for forthcoming meeting. Also many 
Kyrgyz considered that their requirement is obliged to be satisfied;after all they are title 
nation in their country.
53
 
 
 On 4
th
 of June from two arguing sides on a field of collective farming community 
gathered crowds of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Between them settled down with a thin chain armed 
police with machine guns.According to one data, Uzbeks began first: the Uzbek youth, being 
drunk tried to break through a cordon of police and to attack Kyrgyz. Stones and bottles 
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departed to policemen. Uzbeks even took two fighters of special mission unit. In an hour the 
crowd became uncontrollable and policemen started shooting.But there is absolutely opposite 
opinion in compare to given above description of collision beginning.  
 
The Kyrgyz enraged by hearings that Uzbeks look down to Kyrgyz decided to attack 
them. Uzbeks were trying to reject pressure. Trigger was a fact that somebody from Uzbek 
crowd began to cry out words ―Autonomy! Autonomy!‖ For Kyrgyz it was as a signal for 
reaction.
54
Crowd of Kyrgyz having heard shots and having felt aggression of the opposite 
side began to arm with sticks, stones, metal rods and other things. People began to break up 
trees growing on the edge of a field. Though there were radical - mooded personsin crowd, 
nevertheless people kept silent.  
 
Among Kyrgyz people sounded appeals not to give in to provocation, not to move 
towards the Uzbek crowd. Some activists of ―Osh-Ajmagy‖ called everyone for tranquility 
and noted that their purpose is to achieve allocation of the land grounds but not fighting with 
Uzbek population of the city.
55
 At the same time activists declared that if Uzbeks will 
approach to them and will start attacking them, then they will receive worthy repulse.From 
the Uzbek crowd members ―Adolat‖union they were the most active as they cried out various 
slogans existing on Kyrgyz protesters as a red rag on a bull.  
 
From all this it is possible to draw out an opinion that members of two associations 
were the main instigators of disorders during meeting on the field.But it was only the 
beginning. Further actions were acts of violence and murder. The situation got out of control 
and open fight between two warring sides began. Meetingplanned for 3 o'clock dispersed in 
only 35 minutes. Many analysts noticed later that such carrying out of meeting reflect 
planning of such actions before.  
 
It confirms fact of long lasting events that didn‘t end on a day, which succeeded to 
manage with small losses, but proceeded further. Actually, there was a war of quarters over 
all Osh cities next days. Riots against Uzbeks occurred in Uzgen city, in villages Gulcha, 
Zhurkun, Mirza-Aki and others. In Fergana, Andijan and Namangan administrative areas 
                                                 
54
 Shavkat Rakhmon op.cit, 103 
55
 Nurbek Omuraliyev, op.cit 
  
 
 
were noted facts of beating persons of Kyrgyz nationality by Uzbeks. There were arsons of 
houses where lived Kyrgyz and that caused a flow of Kyrgyz refugees from the territory of 
Uzbekistan.The conflict between two communities being domestic began to accept 
interethnic coloring. Residents of Osh, both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz had one strong feeling - 
feeling of revenge. The Soviet army alsowas settled down on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. It 
didn't allow passing conflict to a war phase, but disorders proceeded with the same force. 
 
In time of distemper intellectuals and public figures of two countries could undertake 
something useful to stop a real bloodshed. And such person appeared – this was famous 
Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov who urged Kyrgyz first to stop clashes. He personally went 
to Osh to talk with Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and communicated a lot with youth of the region and 
elders.
56
 Many people considered that exactly Aitmatov‘s trying at last managed to make so-
called reconciliation of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz more, than trying of all other officials together 
taken. 
 
There was no wonder in this as chairmen and heads of states of that time entirely 
depended on recommendations from Moscow, namely from the Kremlin, and couldn‘t act 
free. The chairman of the Central Committee of CPSU of Kyrgyzstan Absamat Masaliyev 
practically stayed idle and was exposed with rigid criticism both by Kyrgyz population and 
regional chairmen.It is possible to say that Masaliyev was literally broken off between the 
difficult situation in state and coupling of his actions of regulation of Osh conflict with the 
Center of USSR.
57
The violence was finally halted by the deployment of over 2,000 members 
of the Soviet airborne.  
 
It was six months before Moscow felt the situation had normalized to the point that 
the troops could be withdrawn.
58
Already in the middle of political crisis when the Soviet 
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Union collapsed and republics were left to their own devices, Masaliyev organized president 
electionswhere Askar Akayev won. 
 
 
§ 2.2 Estimating first Osh riots. 
 
Right there after the Osh events were written reports of KGB, where reasons, which 
have led to emergence of the conflict, were specified.
59
There is a remarkable fact of absence 
of special commission investigating Osh events at that time. Only after a while each side - 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – would study this conflict for itself. In a case of Kyrgyzstan 
investigations were interrupted and sometimes even stopped by unclear reasons. In KGB 
report were a great variety of reasons but the main and the most influencing was the land 
inequality between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks residents of Osh.  
 
There was noted that Osh slaughter was result of ignoring by the authorities social 
problems of the region, increasing discontent because of uneven distribution of municipal 
posts between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, splash of the Kyrgyz nationalism in all areas of 
Kyrgyzstan and also features of clan and breed psychology of both nations. Also negative 
perception of poorer ethnic Kyrgyz that Uzbeks were becoming more prosperous and 
controlling the markets.
60
 
 
The officials of Osh region and its cities didn't estimate this situation properly and, 
thereby, gave the chance for it to pour out into an open collision.Also was a chance of 
violence and murders prevention if in due time regional structures could interfere and 
localizeit with strict measures without having allowed it to spread over neighbour regions. 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides have agreed with some resolutions of this report but both 
declaredthat such mass riots lasting for a certain period of time couldn't have just 
spontaneous character without approval of certain forces.  
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This information is confirmed only by Kyrgyz and Uzbek persons, which were 
considering Osh riots. In this question meet opinions of eyewitnesses and politicians standing 
on the different parties of barricades during the conflict. For example, Zhypar Zheksheev 
who has become in May 1990 one of cochairmen of "Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan" 
and after was a secretary general of the national commission of Kyrgyzstan for UNESCO is 
convinced that the fault for the Osh events lies on KGB of the USSR. It places the main 
emphasis on the fact that such conflicts swept across all Soviet Union in the nineties. "We 
reconsidered a set of video and other materials considering Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi and 
Baku events. And I came to a conclusion that scenario was the same and so are the authors. 
It's possible to guess who was interested in these events without any effort" told in the 
interview to Fergana news portal Zheksheev.
61
 
 
Shavkat Rahmon shares the same opinion, however, he connects Osh events with the 
conflicts of last five years of the Soviet domination: "Since the Soviet‘s policy of 
―Perestroika‖ began all big nations, except Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians have 
managed to fight with each other".
62
 According to Rahmon,events in Zheltoksan and Fergana 
were characterized absolutely from another foreshorteningand Kremlin didn't give them an 
objective assessment for that simple reason that indirectly influenced itself on a way of 
actions developing in above-mentioned events.  
 
Certainly, in the Osh conflict role of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek provokers who were 
initiators of the plan of collisions is emphasized, as their influence was obvious and very 
notable. Here again it‘s useful to remember associations ―Osh Ajmagy‖ and ―Adolat‖ and 
their militant participants. ―And technically it wasn‘t sodifficult to enter one or two provokers 
into a meeting who will start pushing the conflict. At that time situation was very hard and 
only one lit match was enough.‖63 
 
However, despite such statements, other officials consider that situation got out even 
from Moscow‘s control and the conflicts carried over all former Soviet Union territories are 
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just natural combination of circumstances in period of collapsing empire because of a number 
of economic and intraregional problems.Rahmon repeatedly told about open questions that 
still demand an answer. For example, why commission on emergency situations wasn't 
created at the Supreme Council of the USSR in the very first days of the tragedy and why 
Council of the Nations at the Supreme Council of the USSR didn't cause extraordinary 
meeting? All these questions bring only to even bigger deadlock and don't shed light on a real 
picture of those events. On the other hand, the embodiment of the plan of collision between 
two nations on the basis of social, namely land grounds question can't seem really real. Set of 
the factors, which have defined explosion of the Osh conflict, coincided in this period of 
history break (1989-1990).  
 
 
§ 2.3 Kyrgyzstan’s water resources: consumption, shortage and cooperation with 
regional states. 
 
One of the poorest countries of Central Asia in the sphere of natural resources is 
Kyrgyzstan. This factor left a serious mark not only on its economic development. While 
Kyrgyzstan‘s neighbors used their natural resources as a bargaining chip in international 
political arena Kyrgyzstan was suffering quite sharply of problems connected with energy, 
fuel, fresh water resources and the land grounds.  
 
Unlike its Central Asian neighbours, Kyrgyzstan has very insignificant reserves of 
petroleum and natural gas. Kyrgyzstan's principal energy resources are its deposits of coal; 
sub-bituminous coal deposits are found on the southern fringe of the Fergana Valley (at 
Suluktu and Kyzyl-Kyya), while hard coal comes from the west and northwest fringes of the 
valley (at Tash-Komur, Jalal-Abad, and Osh) and in the Tien Shan foothills east of Issyk-Kul 
Lake.
64
 
 
The population of Kyrgyzstan despite quite impressive outflow of many Kyrgyz 
abroad steadily grows up. So necessary quantity of resources continues not to suffice 
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population catastrophically. But much more complex problem is uneven distribution of 
available resources on territory of the country. For example, the considered Osh region more 
than the others suffers from a problem of water and irrigational systems, because there is a 
hydro-thermo electric plant, which consumes a lot of water.
65
As it was already noted earlier, 
there was an obvious imbalance of lands distribution between Kyrgyz and Uzbek population 
in Osh. On new land grounds that were given to Kyrgyz good and developed infrastructure 
was necessary. But there was a heathland, which needed to be equipped.Because of the 
inflamed conflict Uzbeks refused to provide help with anything to new Kyrgyz residents. 
This process of infrastructure development went quite slowly and many times was broken for 
a number of reasons. On the first place was not a land question anymore, but a water issue.
66
 
 
Although the fresh water resources of Kyrgyzstan have enormous potential to 
contribute to the economy of the country, the efficient use of this resource has become a 
matter of big research.
67
Kyrgyzstan is the second largest source of water resources in Central 
Asia after Tajikistan. The average annual surface run-off from the rivers and other water 
sources in Kyrgyzstan accounts for about 45-50 km
3
 per year. This includes about 75% of the 
water of the Syrdarya (27-28 km
3
) River and 2% of the Amudarya (1.9 km
3
) – the two major 
water arteries of the region.
68
 
 
Also a big role in providing population with water plays the longest Naryn River. It 
should be noted a large number of lakes on the territory of the country;the biggest one is 
Issyk-Kyl with the 6236 km
2
 area of water surface.
69
From artificial water reservoirs the first 
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place is held by Toktogul reservoir, which is located in Jalal-Abad region. To all other, 
Toktogul reservoir is one of the biggest in all Central Asia. 
 
The primary storage reservoir is located in, and owned by, the upstream country of 
Kyrgyz Republic, and the bulk of the agricultural production is located in the downstream 
countries of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
70
These resources, which are being utilized by the 
neighboring countries in increasing their agricultural output, the contribution of the same 
resource to the agricultural activities and overall economy of Kyrgyzstan raises serious 
questions.Kyrgyzstan also has huge resources of other ground and surface waters, the 
significant stocks of which are in the rivers, eternal icehouses and snow massifs.  
 
It is paradoxical that despite such impressive stocks the problem of water use remains 
pretty big issue. Water affairs in Kyrgyzstan are badly managed because of the wrong 
distribution of water systems and lack of infrastructure. Here the vicious circle turns out –
water is needed for developing infrastructure in the certain region of the country, and on the 
contrary it is necessary to have logistics for checking and correct use of water reservoirs.  
 
Considering water issues in Kyrgyzstan it becomes evident that problem of water 
using in term of infrastructure depends on too unequal consumption between various sectors: 
industrial, agriculture, household, electricity and others. The consumption of water for 
agricultural irrigation is 88% of total use (about 12% of water is for household and industrial 
consumption).
71
Apparently, the most water-consumedsector is agriculture: almost most part 
of water from different resources (reservoirs, rivers, lakes) goes to irrigation. The problem 
here is that quite often there are water losses because of an inadequate condition of 
irrigational systems. Irrigational systems sometimes have failures in functioning also. 
 
Generally it happens because of features of land relief: the most part of Kyrgyzstan is 
covered with mountains andplateaus. Due to mountainous terrain, the major portion of water 
flows into the territory of neighbouring downstream countries, mainly Uzbekistan and 
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Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent – China and Tajikistan. According to ―Water Resources 
Problem in Kyrgyzstan‖ even about 75% of the river runoff goes out from Kyrgyzstan to 
neigbour countries. The irrigation systems of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on the 
hydro system and water reservoirs located in Kyrgyz territory. More than ten large reservoirs 
for irrigation were built to regulate runoff of transnational rivers: Chui, Naryn, Talas, Ak-
Bura, Kara-Darya.
72
 
 
The second big problem by importance considering water issues of Kyrgyzstan is 
water quality. The outbreaks of water-borne diseases in rural areas are observed not only in 
Kyrgyzstan but also in Uzbekistan. There are risks of the spread of water-borne infections 
such as typhoid fever, bacterial dysentery and other types of diarrheal diseases in rural areas. 
These risks exist because access to the piped centralized drinking water sources in rural areas 
is approximately 50 to 60 percent on average for the whole region.
73
 
 
Number of coli-form bacteria and streptococci in different water sources used by the 
population create high risks of water-borne diseases in the local communities. Such pollution 
of water happens for two reasons: mudflows from mountains mix up with fresh water in 
periods of floods and not well-working system of water purification for repeated and reverse 
osmosis water use couldn‘t help. During very high waters even dams don't rescue many water 
receptacles from dirty mudflows, which mixes with fresh water. For elimination of 
consequences of these disasters the system of water purification and consumption of 
returnable waters is necessary.
74
 
 
With growth of water consumption the quantity of drainage and superficial waters 
formed from use in various branches of economy and household needs increases. This causes 
pollution both natural water reservoirs and underground waters. The system of repeated and 
reverse waters that was used widely in the Soviet Union now became old and useless and 
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demands urgent updating and change of technical equipment considering this method.
75
 
Besides the environmental pollution prevention repeated water supply also allows to save 
clear water many times over. As quality of the water dumped from one technological process 
makes its possible to use in other technological process. So, it‘s impossible to prevent any 
outbreaks of the water-borne diseases without creation of the relevant system of monitoring, 
including check of water structure and water supply system. 
 
But there is one huge advantage of water resources of Kyrgyzstan: these are hydro-
electricpower generator plants and stations. They serve not only for needs of Kyrgyzstan, but 
also for necessities of neighboring countries.Kyrgyzstan spends scanty amount of coal, gas 
and fuel oil for electricity production. Over 80% of electricity is produced by hydro-power 
plants. The hydro-electric potential of Kyrgyzstan is estimated to be over 160 billion kWh per 
year, 10% of which is currently utilized.
76
 
 
The five major hydro-electric power generator plants are located on the Naryn River 
below Toktogul reservoir and two thermo-electric plants located in Bishkek and Osh generate 
electricity and heating for these towns and the surrounding areas. All this organizes huge 
enterprise, so-called ―cascade of Toktogul hydro power plants‖.77 Thus, Kyrgyzstan has what 
to offer Central Asia republics that really need water very much, except Tajikistan.  
 
Water turned out for region countries to the blue gold, because its shortage is 
constantly felt over all Central Asia.The significant problems confronting the entire region of 
Central Asia—lack of water, lack of cultivated soil, boundary issues—are by their very 
nature prone to dispute. But among all these problems the problem of water ranks first in the 
region. However, cooperation in sphere of energy and resources isn't at the proper level. 
Water, used for power generation by Kyrgyzstan, is also vital for Uzbekistan and southern 
Kazakhstan for irrigation purposes. Uzbekistan needs water especially sharply, especially for 
industrial needs, for example, such as irrigation of cotton fields.  
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In the early 1990s, the Central Asian states tried to reach multi-party agreements on 
water-sharing in the region.
78
 However, most of the agreements proved ineffective, and 
instead the countries have opted for annual bilateral agreements. In Central Asia different 
contradictions between neighboring countries stir cooperation between them.In the political 
arena, all the leaders of the newly created states of Central Asia prize their countries‘ 
sovereignty, while some of them compete with each other for control of resources, especially 
water and energy like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; for supremacy in regional leadership - 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - or just prefer to operate in strict neutrality to the point of 
isolation like Turkmenistan. 
 
The tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over Tajikistan‘s intentions to build 
the hydro-dam at Rogun that has led to actions by Uzbekistan that have severely affected 
Tajikistan, including selective border closures, interference with rail transit and blockage of 
Tajikistan‘s access to electricity and gas imports.79 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan abandoned 
the existing regional electric power dispatch mechanism that had existed in Central Asia 
since Soviet days, directly undermining the development of a regional energy market.
80
 
 
Between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there are also economic barriers because of the 
Customs Union, in which Kazakhstan is a member.  But there are positive moments of 
interregional cooperation as well.Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have concluded their first 
agreement on the joint distribution of water resources and energy power. The countries 
concluded various agreements on coordinated water use—in particular, the Agreement of 
February 1992 and the Nukus Declaration.
81
 
 
 
§ 2.4 Uzbekistan’s Energy Resources in Compare to Misbalance in Osh region.  
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In comparison with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, which is rich with resources, constantly 
develops its energy industry and carries out numerous projects.Uzbekistan provides itself 
with gas, oil and coal almost completely.Agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
through which the Syrdarya also flows, ensure a continued water flow for Uzbek power 
plants.
82
Country is trying to become a certain leader in region with the help of natural 
resources and using them a pressure lever for political ambitions.  
 
By the mid-1990s, as a result of Government measures, energy policy adopted by the 
Government during the early years of independence had been achieved: energy independence 
and self-sufficiency by resources.
83
 The measures Uzbekistan took during its first years of 
political independence to ensure its fuel independence made it possible to significantly 
increase the country‘s output of natural gas, oil and natural gas condensate. A number of 
national and sector projects had been devised and were being implemented to develop the 
power, petroleum, natural gas and coal industries; for example, Kokdumalak petroleum 
condensate field and Bukhara Oil Refinery. Sulphur scrubbers had been installed at the 
Mubarek Natural Gas Refinery and power-generating unit had been completed at the 
Novoangren Thermal Power Plant.
84
 
 
Even for accommodation seasonal variations in natural gas use, there is a network of 
underground natural gas storage facilities. Uzbekistan had a well developed and sizeable 
system of long-distance natural gas pipelines and pipeline bleeders as well as a distribution 
network for transporting natural gas from gas fields and refineries to consumers in 
Uzbekistan and abroad. Oil and gas industry and infrastructure is still developing in 
Uzbekistan with big rates. Special attention to this sector is paid by state as this industrial 
area is completely nationalized. 
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The resource base allows Uzbekistan to be ill with the ―Dutch illness‖ and to continue 
investin sector of raw materials and fuel production again and again.The Uzbek population is 
also interested in development of oil business as it creates the greatest number of workplaces 
in country, even a bit more that cotton industry. A lot of prosperous Uzbeks moved and lived 
in the neighbouring republics; part of them lived there historically, other part moved recently 
to new territories.
85
 
 
In Osh region and its cities urban population mostly consisted of Uzbeks and 
mountaineer rural population generally were Kyrgyz people. Soon the social inequality 
between two ethnic groups began to accrue. A huge role in an imbalance played both social 
and resources inequality, because using of water as an energy resource on an equal basis with 
oil and fuel demand big expenses and infrastructure and that was impossible project for 
Kyrgyz Republic.  
 
As Kyrgyz population of Osh region appeared in more difficult situation, then right 
there accelerated growth of nationalistic moods as almost always-low standards of living are 
characterized by splashes of nationalism and radical tendencies in communities or societies.  
 
 
§ 2.5 Ethno-symbolist approach to Kyrgyzstan. 
  
The history of relationship between Central Asian ethnics and Russia has passed quite 
a long way. The Russian diplomacy had great opportunities during this time to study and 
learn other ethnics thoroughlyand to regulate their situation in the Tsar Russia.
86
Regulations 
were carried out by special developed methods. Already in the USSR the main method of 
deduction and pressure was the principle of "divide and rule".
87
This principle revealed itself 
quite obviously and convex throughout the time of Union‘s existing.  
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After USSR‘s collapse, Russia, being not able to develop at once new methods for 
deduction of old zones of influence was still using mentioned above method. But time of 
brutalpower for a binding of certain regions has already passed. This was not a necessary 
political tool any more. Here it‘s useful to remember events of the 2008occurred in Georgia, 
when Russia entered its troops to that country. Kremlin behaved suddenly very clumsy in this 
situation.
88
Hard power was obvious: not only because of intervention, but diligence to 
replace borders on map as well. This operation affected negatively on Russia‘s reputation. 
Even so negatively, that many people inclined to thoughtthat namely Russia‘s policy was a 
trigger in Georgian situation. Therefore, after those died-down events, the course of the 
Russian policy changed considerably.  
 
A new principle came to arena – it was ethno-symbolist approach toward zones of 
influence. Roughly speaking, it‘s about having influence in the region or the state, when you 
proceed only from internal contradictions of state or contradictions with its neighbors, but 
trying not to designate in any way itself as the enemy. On the contrary, actor using this 
method comes in an image of savior when bloody actions reached the peak already. This 
method was probably borrowed from globalpolitical practice, but Russia began to apply it 
quite recently. Such approach was more sophisticated, and therefore it was imperceptible. 
Actually, it was very difficult to catch a side between influence of the actor and his inaction 
(as all could be seem like natural combination of misunderstandings inside one ethnos or 
between two ethnics).
89
 Riots that took place in Osh could indicate such approach.  
 
According to father of ethno-symbolism – Anthony Smith, economic self-interest is 
not usually the stuff of stable collective identities, while cultural collectivities are more stable 
because the basic cultural elements – memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions – tend 
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to be more persistent and binding.
90
Thus, it is clear that only economic influence and social 
structure are not enoughfor establishing firm influence.  
 
It is necessary to take into account ethnical values and its symbols and to play 
political game considering these tendencies. For example, the nationalism and symbolism in 
Kyrgyzstan was widely adopted; almost the same was in Uzbekistan in 2000s. Using this 
approach it was possible to achieve much more, than simply to divide zones by principle of 
geographical borders. 
 
Ethno-symbolists consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, 
ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms. Various 
combinations of these elements continue to play a vital role within the communities.
91
Thus, it 
was easily possible to divide and mark out main differences between the South and the North 
of Kyrgyzstan. Also it was possible to designate distinctions between sedentarizm of Uzbeks 
and nomadism of Kyrgyz. 
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Chapter III.The Rise of Nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
§ 3.1 Nationalism in Kyrgyz Society. 
 
 To consider external influence on repeated escalation of Osh conflict domestic 
situation in Kyrgyzstan should be taken into account very carefully. Certain internal 
conditions and political tendencies in a conflict zone are necessary for conflict to be ripened 
and then to be passed to the following stage. The so-called zone of risk is usually an unstable 
territory filled with various radical or far-right ideologies.
92
 The last is very important in a 
context of the reasons for emergence of the second Osh riots in 2010. The reason of 
increasing tension in Kyrgyz-Uzbek population werenationalist sentiments of Kyrgyz people. 
At the the beginning this nationalistic wave wasn't destructive,  on the contrary, it was uniting 
people and arose interest to history and culture. But after being speculated by various 
politicians it went by another way. 
 
 The nationalism in Kyrgyzstan takes its roots from the very beginning of 90s, when 
new republics undertook construction and an upclassing of national states. Nation should 
have its own territory, and that this territorial nation-state should in some way reflect the 
character of the nation - it is the ideology of the world divided into nation-states into which 
independent Kyrgyzstan was ―born‖ in 1991.93 This ideology informs the state-led nation-
building projects that all Central Asian governments embarked on in 1991. Kyrgyzstan here 
have too much similarities with other republics, gained independence: same course, same 
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priorities and tasks. Many commentators predicted that after the 1990 violence the region in 
general and Kyrgyzstan in particular was likely to be marked by widespread ethno-nationalist 
violence. These predictions were based not on empirical research but rather on uncritical 
invocation of ‗ethnicity‘ as an independent and supremely powerful social force.94 It didn‘t 
influence negatively on relationship with other ethnic groups.  
 
There was a strong nationalist movement among the young students in the late 80s. 
The movement also formed a number of student organizations with clear nationalist and anti-
Communist orientations. This movement very soon reestablished into Ashar community, 
which has different branches all over Kyrgyzstan: it was something like first manifestation of 
multiparty system. But Ashar don‘t stay as it was reestablished for a long time: after some 
years all branches consolidated into one and a new union called Democratic Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan was created on 26 May, 1990.
95
This small stroke allows learning about moods of 
Kyrgyz society when there were no preconditions to the Osh conflict yet.  
 
The Kyrgyz Union Republic was a multiethnic formation and still has a substantial 
presence of minorities despite emigration.The largest minority is Uzbeks, then come 
Russians; others are small: Dungans, Uyghurs, etc.
96
 Thus, already in 90s there were certain 
difficulties with a self-definition of many representatives of ethnic minorities living in in 
Kyrgyzstan, as to the forefront was put factor of titular nation. When the "nation" was 
created, works were commissioned to demonstrate its historical roots. Stable community was 
ensured by allocation of republican status.Territorial borders of the new republic were 
defined, and industrial facilities were established to provide economic foundations for it. 
 
Kyrgyz was vulnerable. The Kyrgyz were a small group squeezed in-between the 
larger neighbours of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China, with relations with each of these 
becoming problematic following independence. In the argument as to ‗who-has-been- on-
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this-land-first‘, the Kyrgyz were on weak ground.97Being historical nomads with no urban 
centers, it was more difficult for them to claim the territory as theirs. Therefore Kyrgyz had 
counter reactions: as a result strengthening of national consciousness as a counterbalance to 
those circumstances began to rise rapidly. But at the same time it‘s impossible to say that 
Kyrgyz felt themselves restrained, they just tried to seem especially among other Central 
Asian nations. It wasa fight period of states for popularity and welfare not only in the region, 
but, whenever possible, in the world. That‘s why Kyrgyz people didn't want to stand aside: 
even centrist movements were observed among population in order to keep strong their 
national identity.
98
 
 
Many considered that the extreme nationalism became the main reason of second Osh 
riots. In fact, Kyrgyz nationalism went in a wrong way. According to Nick Megoran, foreign 
analysts have misunderstood nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Most Western studies have critically 
engaged with the nation-building projects of the governments of the newly independent 
republics, faulting them for the inauthenticity of their use of history and their ethnic 
exclusivity in post-Soviet contexts where many ethnic minorities live.
99
But historical 
trajectory of Kyrgyz nationalism is marked by a profound insecurity about the very survival 
of the country, and the fear that Kyrgyzstan is primarily endangered by the weak state of the 
Kyrgyz language, internal disunity, and geopolitical threats.
100
 
 
The first thing that is obviously evident in studying Kyrgyz nationalism is a situation 
with the Kyrgyz language in the country. Language is often a pivotal factor in nation-
building, and this is particularly the case in Kyrgyzstan.From the historical situation it turned 
out that Russian and the Uzbek languages werein Kyrgyzstan at much more highest 
qualitative level, than Kyrgyz language.  
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After the Soviet power was established in the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region,the 
forerunner of present day Kyrgyzstan,Kyrgyz found themselves among numerous ethnic 
groups, which were arranged unevenly on the territory of a state. Many Uzbek 
communitiescompactly lived in the south and in north there were Kazakhs.The South is 
perceived as more traditional and more religious, while the northern side is closer to the 
neighbouring Kazakhs.
101
 
The Russians living mostly near Ferghana valley along south borders occupied the 
considerable part of the country. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed extensive 
Russian farming settlement in the fertile lowlands of Osh and Jalalabad provinces. In 1909, 
the Ferghana statistics committee registered 29,433 Russians. By the turn of the twenty-first 
century no trace was left of that, and few mostly older generation Russians remain in urban 
areas.Nevertheless, in modern Kyrgyzstan Russian has a status of official language in 
Kyrgyzstan, while Kyrgyz is the state language.
102
 Official documents and forms are 
available in both, as well as access to educational opportunities, mass media, street signs and 
posters. 
 
Development of the Kyrgyz language is slowed down very much by this factor. The 
base for competent studying and development of the Kyrgyz language is still in progress, 
despite the fact that Soviet rule resulted in the first systematic written codification, 
development and promotion of the Kyrgyz language, establishing universal literacy and the 
emergence of a nationwide stream of Kyrgyz schooling.
103
 
 
 But becoming more nationalized groups of Kyrgyz within the country askfor literate 
and fluent language. It turns out that there is a request form population, but no goods to be 
present. Even Kyrgyz nationalists sardonically draw a distinction between people who are 
Kyrgyz (pronounced with a Kyrgyz hard ‗y‘) of and Kirgiz (pronounced with a Russian soft 
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‗i‘) – the latter being elites who spoke better Russian than Kyrgyz and are thus linguistically 
and culturally alienated from authentic ‗Kyrgyzness‘.104  In their opinion, the respect for 
Kyrgyzstan has to begin if not with knowledge of language, then at least with an attempt to 
study the native language. The language problem caused a lot of debates in the Kyrgyz 
society. Kyrgyz language played second-fiddle to Russian in education, politics and the 
professions.
105
 Kyrgyz cultural forms of music and oral poetry were denigrated. 
 
But more difficult situation with a Kyrgyz language problem in Osh - here besides 
Russian language presents a factor of well-adjusted Uzbek language. Uzbeks had schools, 
newspapers and magazines; also it was possible to meet many bookstores with Uzbek 
language books everywhere in Osh. The mass of literature in Uzbek language wasn‘t printed 
in Kyrgyzstan, but was brought from Uzbekistan.
106
 It is remarkable that these Uzbeks know 
Kyrgyz really badly, and what about second language - this for them was Russian. All this 
caused an indignation storm among Kyrgyz people, who considered that Uzbeks behave quite 
impudently in this way. However, according to Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan, they had great 
difficulties with learning and reading in Uzbek language, as Uzbekistan switched to the Latin 
alphabet, while Uzbeks of Osh and Jalal-Abad continued to use Cyrillic script.
107
 Language 
became one of the key moments in tension accruing between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and 
Russians and Kyrgyz in state as well. According to an article in Kyrgyz newspaper 
―Ferghana‖ Kyrgyz people were poorly motivated for learning their language. There were 
marked various reasons as including the poor teaching of Kyrgyz in Russian and Uzbek 
schools, the influence of Russian and Uzbek television and absence of laws obliging people 
to know Kyrgyz to take citizenship or enter state employment.
108
Kyrgyz had a strong feeling 
that Uzbeks feeling quite freely in their territory will start actions about receiving autonomy 
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again. As it was already noted in previous chapters a big social abyss between two nations 
promoted such hostility.  
 
Some analysts explaining such turn in Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations referred to an ethno-
psychological factor and, as a result of it, further appropriate behavior of each ethnos. Results 
of numerous conversations have been carried out. Focus groups were observed in Osh and 
Jalal-Abad. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks perceived each other really differently, but at the same time 
they noted their common cultural values, that both nations share. But in negative adjectives 
they were open and talkative. So, Uzbeks by Kyrgyz residents‘ opinions ―are richer and in 
unjust way took the best lands from them‖. There were other opinions like  ―life of Uzbeks is 
always hidden from foreign eyes‖ and ―Uzbeks are cunning and liars". According to Uzbeks, 
Kyrgyz people are ―wild‖ and ―mountaineers‖.109 Mountaineer in this definition has negative 
coloring meaning backward and incapable to create people. Also there were adjectives like 
―aggressive‖ and ―lazy‖. Uzbeks have accused Kyrgyz of too exaggerate hearings about their 
welfare, when in real Uzbeks are discriminated and clamped in their right.
110
 
 
Kyrgyz accuse Uzbeks of receiving profit and income from business by unfair means 
with the help of trustful Kyrgyz.Moving from the Soviet to post-Soviet times, Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz became social alien, as common civic affiliation could not overcome differences in 
political status and in social resources.
111
Large numbers of Kyrgyz abandoned their 
traditional way of life at years of Russian dominance in the region.
112
Kyrgyz from the south 
of Kyrgyzstan considered that they start from scratch, as it is still very difficult for them to be 
well skilled and urbanized in city life. And Uzbeks instead of helping and understandingthem 
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were getting rich byunfair ways on their land.The Kyrgyz could not see why Uzbeks were 
unhappy with personnel appointments, as no formal barriers prevented them from joining the 
civil service.In such situation the Kyrgyz nationalism grew more and more as to be 
reconciled with such relation of Uzbeks toward them was shameful for Kyrgyz.  
 
Kyrgyz believed that Uzbeks behave too frivolously in the south of the country, while 
Kyrgyz living in Uzbekistan don't afford any excess actions. On television and in mass media 
appeared appeals of the Kyrgyz intellectuals to representatives of ethnic minorities directed 
on studying Kyrgyz language. But Uzbek narratives relate a story of how Uzbeks 
traditionally lived in the city and worked as artisans, cooks, traders and technicians, but the 
Kyrgyz gradually displaced them, taking land, jobs and wealth. Kyrgyz narratives invert 
these accounts and have Osh‘s land traditionally controlled by Kyrgyz tribes.113In Kyrgyz 
talks of Osh as a contested space, Uzbeks played a role of separators and those who threaten 
Kyrgyz statehood.
114
Also Kyrgyz ethnic group excledues Uzbeks from state politics because 
of fears about them being some kind of ―Fifth Column‖ and aiming for unification with 
Uzbekistan.
115
 Thus, it‘s visible that situation in itself was very ambiguous between two 
ethnicities as everyone considered himself right and accused opposite side in its troubles.  
 
A considerable influence also rendered a role of the Kyrgyz politicians who pursued 
interior policy under the name of revival of the Kyrgyz statehood and nationality. This 
ideology promoted kindling of nationalistic and non-tolerant moods among Kyrgyz, despite 
that in 90s this ideology in government had quite peace character.  
 
 
3.2 Nationalism among Kyrgyz Politicians. 
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―Everyone in Central Asia wants to create something great, no one wants anything 
simple‖.116This phrase can be fairly related to all five republics of Central Asia. In this case, 
considering Kyrgyzstan, it‘s possible to tell that the state itself chose a certain national 
strategy for the very beginning. At the time of Askar Akayev such plans worked quite good, 
as, for example, turning Kyrgyzstan into Switzerland of region and the ideologywith a motto 
"Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home" also was declared.
117
 In Akayev‘s books central theme 
was a cultural and historical sophistication of the Kyrgyz as an ethnic group. And what is the 
most interesting thing is that Akayev also promulgated Kyrgyzstan as an ―Island of 
Democracy‖ in the region.  
 
"Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home" was a vital plan for Kyrgyzstan as it was way to 
keep balance between numerous ethnic groups within the country, which was a difficult issue 
after collapsed empire. Akayev promoted integration of local Russians, Ukrainians and 
Germans and stimulated them not to leave country, but remain and work in 
Kyrgyzstan.
118
Kyrgyz-Slavic University was renamed after the former Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin and Russian language was established as a a second national language in 
Kyrgyzstan.
119
 
 
According to many analysts, concerning Uzbeks a correct strategy was chosen.
120
 In 
Akayev‘ period numerous cultural joint events of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were held and the 
Uzbek -Kyrgyz schools were created. Even Uzbeks that left Osh after conflict events 
remembered that at Akayev‘s time of governing there was no oppression or a latching of 
Uzbeks from the authorities, but there was household nationalism that took place several 
times. The chosen strategy about a common home gave fruits that did Kyrgyzstan during this 
period a stable country for investments and future projects. 
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In practice, however, Akayev‘s civic-based ideas were not as successful and 
persuasive as they appeared. Although Akayev pioneered the modern definition of citizenship 
in Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asian region, both Kyrgyz political elites and the republic had 
difficulties in separating the ideas of citizenship, nationality, nation and ethnicity. 
121
 
 
The young republic only began the way of its national revival and therefore to orient 
and separate necessary and useful from harmful and radical for Kyrgyz officials was still 
quite difficult. Tens years of the Soviet rule introduced its own concepts about above-
mentioned terms; in fact, they weren't wrong or bad, but they just were carried other 
meanings. Therefore newly appeared politicians of Kyrgyzstan tried to make up for lost time 
and sharply follow a revival way of Kyrgyz statehood, as they called it. National ideas among 
politicians differed by degree of nationalism. At that time from all politicians of Kyrgyzstan 
the most liberal was just president Akayev.  
 
Other authorities participating in politics didn't share its views and considered him too 
soft in relations with regional neighbors, especially Russia and also too slow in promotion 
pure Kyrgyz culture. According to many authors, during this period Kyrgyz far 
rightsappeared.
122
 They subjected Akayev's actions on preservation of ethnic Russians in 
Kyrgyzstan. While almost in all republics of the former USSR was watched mass outflow of 
Russians, Akayev was trying to keep them and create available conditions for them, so they 
wouldn‘t like to leave Kyrgyzstan. It incited many politicians against him and forced 
Akayevto nationalize interior policy. He, actually, made a deal with Kyrgyz conservatives 
and far-rights and began to extend and propagandize the Kyrgyz culture very actively in all 
spheres of society. Scope of such acts was extensive. 
 
In the summer of 1995, Akayev organized celebrations for Manas‘s symbolic 1,000th 
anniversary. ―Manas‖ – one of the world‘s longest oral epic narrations is an epos of Kyrgyz 
folklore. At the same time it‘s a name of the main character. For Kyrgyz themselves ―Manas‖ 
always had a huge value and played a big role in keeping their national consciousness as 
Manas managed to unite separate Kyrgyz and to reflect attacks of the neigboor tribes, despite 
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that Manas is acollective image.
123
In Soviet period wasn't pay due attention to this epos, as 
the main hero fought against Chinese and this could affect to the Sino-Soviet relations a bit 
negatively.  
 
For the Kyrgyz government, the ―Manas‖ represented a comfortable option for a 
national ideological framework. Akayev emphasized the importance of Manas in his public 
openings and speeches, and even authored a book dedicated to the epic.
124
All this added to   
Akayev greater popularity among the people and also didn't give more chance to the Kyrgyz 
nationalists to accuse him of inaction and ignoring of Kyrgyz culture. Almost a religious cult 
of Manas testifies fact of Akayev‘s comparingthis epos and its value for Kyrgyz to the New 
Testament for Christians.
125
 Also Akayev used Manas's celebration during elections, as just 
in 1995 there were first presidential elections in independent Kyrgyzstan. Popularity of a cult 
of Manas increased so greatly that his 7 precepts soon were hung at each school and were 
discussed and propagandized in mass media. Probably, already then it was a certain sign for 
the subsequent bloody conflicts in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Many people after Osh will tell that Manas's precepts were apprehended too literally 
and that Kyrgyz were trying to realize all his precepts among which were militant calls. 
Today, in XXI centuryno one should understand literally legend words of those days and try 
to imitate behaviour of epos characters. However, Kyrgyz who have yearned on spirit of a 
national ideology absorbed in themselves any fragment of their historical property in order to 
feel more patriotic. Despite the difficulties encountered with popularizing Manas, the epic 
provided a prolific groundwork for transforming the national ideology into a more 
generalized and less ethno-centric project in the early 2000s.
126
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But Manas was not the only one. Very soon other historical characters, dates and 
events came after that celebration. A new era of ―Kyrgyzness‖ was beginning. Politicians in 
every way tried to use national moods of populations and play this card in political games as 
good as the only can. However, one moment wasn't considered: low welfare of the society, 
especially in rural areas and poor social protection with accruing nationalism could play an 
evil joke. But it was still far before explosion of such time bomb.
127
 
 
 A new project, which was called ―2,200 years of Kyrgyz civilization‖, was 
developed.
128
 Such loud name caused among many Kyrgyz laughter and some indignation. 
Akayev seemed to overload his task over national revival. But this project was established 
during controversial third term of Akayev‘s presidency, when there was widespread public 
acknowledgement of the pervasive involvement of his family members in the country‘s 
economy. To keep his name of promoter of national heritage of Kyrgyzstan Akayev took this 
step, which was unsuccessful not only from political, but also from the economic point of 
view as money for implementation of many grandiose projects simply didn't suffice. 
 
Besides such projects and ideas, which among people were called ―akayevskie‖, there 
were also other views of Kyrgyz spirit revival. The idea of a Tengrism, ancient Turkic-
Mongolian nomadic religious beliefsthat had to be transformed now to national ideology, 
began to gather considerable number of supporters among Kyrgyz politicians. The most 
active was Dastan Sarygulov with his proclamations about Tengrism view and culture.
129
 
Adakhan Madumarov supported him, in spite of the fact that Madumarov was a strong 
supporter of westernization of the Kyrgyzstan and introduction of the western values. 
 
Tengrism as an ideology promptly grew and caused interest in the most different 
segments of the Kyrgyz population. Some public figures opposed Islam and a Tengrism and 
insisted that it‘s necessary immediately to return to the native religion, which corresponds to 
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way and outlook of true Kyrgyz people.
130
According to Sarygulov, Islam was imposed to 
Kyrgyz and therefore it shouldn't cause due servility, only respect and that's it. In the public 
companies and in mass media there appeared a lot of information considering Tengristic 
mythology, its gods and goddesses and ceremonies.
131
 
 
While in neighboor Uzbekistan was watched a rising of Islam in society and many 
youngunemployed men were recruited in ranks of IMU, in Kyrgyzstan there were hot 
discussions about native beliefs and ways of returning to them. This was also a sign of 
extreme nationalization of population as practically always return and interest to the roots in 
all spheres, even in such, that seems to be unshakable as religion bears a call to people 
around.
132, 133
 
 
In gender issues were venerated various Kyrgyz women heroines, both mythic and 
real as, for example, Kurmanzhan Datka and Manas‘s wife Kanykey. Among them was also 
Umai Ene goddess, which collected in itself almost all best and noble qualities of nomadic 
women, Kyrgyz women in this context.
134
All this created almost a new cultural and political 
layer in the states, in which earlier there were no ideologies like these at all. Some note, that 
Kyrgyzstan promoting gender equality and cultural heritage of a Tengrism tried to build a 
special new image among Central Asian countries and to be allocated against them.  
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However, despite projects concerning revival of national consciousness there were 
huge problems with poverty in country‘s regions. It wasn't regarded as of paramount 
importance and solvation of poverty problem went too slowly. Just three southern provinces 
of Kyrgyzstan had the higher levels of poverty and extreme poverty. Also in the early 2000s, 
the level of inequality increased dramatically, while the level of poverty was decreasing very 
slowly.
135
 Unemployment is another major social issue, which accelerates the deeping of 
poverty in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
According to Falkingham, the payments for unemployment are insignificantly little 
and it suffices only on food purchase, on all the rest it is necessary to save money.
136
 
Thedifficult situation of the southern areas also caused by influence of criminal groups and 
various smuggler mafias here. In situation nationalism, which has lifted its head, could be 
very dangerous not only for the population, but also for president of the country.  
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Chapter IV.Different Aspects of Kyrgyz Policy: from A. Akayev to K. Bakiyev. 
 
§ 4.1 Factor of North and South in Kyrgyz Policy. 
 
One very important factor, by which the policy of Kyrgyzstan is provided, both at the 
time of the USSR and at the time of independence of the country, should be noted directly. 
This is a non-literal division of the country for the North and the South; sources of this 
division, however, are not industrial and infrastructural, but rather tribalistic and mental. 
Such division of the country allowed to pursue here a certain policy of other regional actors 
as for Kyrgyz people he clannishness and tribal division always played huge role in life.
137
 It 
was possible with using this factor to incite just theoretically southerners against northerners 
or on the contrary, as the differences between the South and the North were visible with the 
naked eye as this issue brings split in Kyrgyz society.
138
 
 
Unlike division into three zhuz (tribal communities) in Kazakhstan and clan 
separation depending on territories in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz society has its peculiarities. 
Apart from position in a tribe, it is also important to know which-northern or southern- part 
of the republic a person belongs to.
139
 
 
The South of Kyrgyzstan, where also located Osh administrative region, was mainly 
agricultural rural zone. Communication between north and south is also tenuous. While 
regular flights link Bishkek to Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken, there are only two usable roads 
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through the mountains to connect north to south. It is a full day's drive to travel the 650 
kilometers between Bishkek and Osh.
140
 There was the biggest Uzbek community and Osh 
was known very well as a place of compact accommodation of Uzbeksin Kyrgyzstan. 
According to Mikheev, the south of Kyrgyzstan is not monolithic, because in the Jalal-Abad 
region and in Osh a substantial portion of the population is Uzbek.
141
 In Osh, more than a half 
of the population is not Kyrgyz but Uzbek.Southerners of Kyrgyzstan differed with bigger 
religiousness and conservatism in compare to those who lived in northern part.  
 
The North gravitated to Kazakhstan and here sometimes could be found quite 
freethinking innovations and liberalism with tolerance manifestations concerning ethnic 
minority, in spite of the fact that North was more likely to seem mosaic because of the 
various ethnic groups living here, as it was noted before, for example, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Germans, Uyghurs, Dunghans and others. Economically, without a doubt, the north is more 
developed. Bishkek is in this part of the country. It has all economic centers built during the 
Soviet years.
142
The northern tribes came into contact with the Russians much earlier than the 
southern tribes, who were part of the Uzbek Empire of Khokant.
143
 
 
Also the factor of such separation within the country was explained by different 
Kyrgyz generas: there was certain division between generas living in the North and in the 
South. In the pre-Russian times the Kyrgyz society was made up by some forty tribal units 
(uruk), each of which consisted of different sub-levels units (top) that were united by 
(imagined) kinship links. The uruks were united into three big confederations, the so-called 
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Right Wing (On khanat), the Left Wing (Sol khanat) and Neither (Ichkilik).
144
But with 
growth of economic instability and unemployment huge outflow of southerners run from 
native places to the North for seeking a better life.  
 
Before the 2005 coup tribal ties were strong in rural communities, today it is getting 
stronger in urban areas as well amid the growing migration from the south to the north in 
2005-2010.
145
This factor of the North and the South was most brightly expressed in politics 
and even could shake whole layers of public moods in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Politicians in Kyrgyzstan were alternated by the principle: one from the North, next 
from the South. In Soviet era Kremlin was careful about dividing the power, it was balancing 
representatives from both parts.For example, being the last governor official of Kyrgyzstan, 
Masaliyev, was a southerner, bit his follower, Askar Akayev, was from the North.
146
 When 
Bakiyev came to power no one was surprised that he is from the South. There was a special 
privileging for clans and generas of an area, where the president is from. This unspoken rule 
was kept in power pretty good. But many personalities from Kyrgyz intellectuals try to erase 
such here division in society after Kyrgyzstan‘s finding independence.147 
 
Jolboldu Alybaev exactly described such situation of not unity of Kyrgyz nation: ―We 
don‘t have a good identity, we are not developing, we need one. We have enough of the 
resources that we need – land, people, etc.; but we have poor leaders, no ideology, and we 
need it, to unite the people. The challenges of disunity are many: North and South, 
(tribalism), other ethnic groups. Our leaders are only pursuing their own interests, making us 
capitalist; they are not thinking about the people, so it is vital that we unite.‖148However, the 
greatest split in such mental and tribal division brings absolutely other factor, which does the 
Kyrgyz society very vulnerable for military collisions and the other armed conflicts. 
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§ 4.2 Influence of Clan Policy and Mafias. 
 
One of the main factors deepening the divide of Kyrgyz on northern and southern was 
clan policy. The clan factor is characteristic for many countries of the former Soviet Union, 
and often it‘s the tool in state policy of the country. In this plan Kyrgyzstan became a bright 
example. Representatives of North and South battled not only for the power in the 
government and the privilege for people from their clan, but also they tried to allocate for 
themselves the income from various sectors of national economy.
149
 Besides representatives 
of political clan elite there were monopolists in the sphere of illicit trade and drugs trafficking 
as well.  
 
There are several areas in which money can be made in Kyrgyzstan on a large scale 
and several individual (who are, supposedly, the patrons of larger criminal gangs) involved. 
The number one area of criminal activity in Kyrgyzstan is without a doubt drug trafficking. 
The major producer of opium poppy based drugs in the world throughout the 1990‘s until 
today is Afghanistan.
150
During the first years of existence of independent states the regime of 
border control on the Afghani border was broken because of the civil war in Tajikistan, and 
later - by the unilateral activity of Turkmenistan on the establishment of relations with 
Talibs.
151
 At the same time the process of direct involvement of representatives of the state 
and political structures of the Central Asian countries in illegal drug trafficking has started.
  
All this makes unsafe especially South part of the country where plantations on 
cultivation of drugs are mainly concentrated. But as for the southern areas this business is the 
fastest in aspect of fast money profit, it involves a very big number of young Kyrgyz and 
creates between clans the rigid competition for the right of drugs transit and deliveries.
152
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Drugs business was especially prospering in regions ofOsh and Jalal Abad; actually 
these places began to be named as drug centers of Kyrgyzstan. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan, there 
are three main areas where drugs are circulating and sold. These are Bishkek city, and the 
Chui and Osh regions. So far, there are no indications that drug trafficking will 
decrease.
153
For many Kyrgyz, engaged in drug trafficking, it was the only way to go abroad 
in order to earn much more money than in Kyrgyzstan. Besides Kyrgyzstan passed the main 
drugs traffic way, it also for was a supplier of drugs for other Central Asian states. Chui 
valley became well-known thanks to this business. Groups of the Tajik drug dealers and their 
mafias were also among main suppliers and distributor of drugs.
154
From western Tajikistan 
directly into Kyrgyzstan or via Uzbekistan, opiate trafficking groups are able to take 
advantage of Kyrgyzstan‘s Osh regions‘ weak border controls.155Such situationdeveloped 
from the beginning of the 90s when plants and factories were closed, the old system of 
economy planning and social sphere were thrown out, but a new one wasn‘t‘ created. 
 
In fact, by the second half of the ninetieth, the structure of drug trafficking through the 
Central Asian countries takes shape on the whole. With reference to East routes of the 
Central Asian direction (Tajikistan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan) it appears as follows. 
The organization of transit is carried out by general coordination, the issues of transit to the 
neighbouring territory transfer of the cargo from the Tajik suppliers to the Kyrgyz groups, 
and from Kyrgyz - to Kazakh groups.
156,157
 Such close mutualdrug cooperation in Central 
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Asia reflected benefits of such transactions for clans and also lack of criminal prosecution of 
drug dealers. 
 
Studies of the structure of the drug traffic in the country have led analysts to believe 
that several high-level officials have divided the drug trafficking market of Kyrgyzstan 
between themselves, but so far they have not been identified.It only could help to understand 
why drug business could reach such scale in the country and also in the whole region.
158
  
According to this, such situation in the country was favorable to officials and authorities that 
didn't try to change or stop drugs‘ routes deliveries. Here it was possible to speak about a 
peculiar pyramid where on a top were clan leaders or other officials, on the second stage 
there were clans which collected money, and the last layer consisted of clan people which 
were engaged in drugs trafficking. This doesn't mean at all that all officials or representatives 
of a government were anyway involved in drug traffic or they had communications with the 
drug dealer‘s clans.159 Many clans were busy in smuggling of products or materials, than in 
drugs sales. To determine even concrete cases is quite difficult, but that regions of 
Kyrgyzstan‘s South had a great concentration of criminal issues is obvious.  
 
Besides drug business, also one of the most important problems is smuggling, 
particular cotton smuggling, considered as white gold of all Central Asian region. Capacity of 
smuggler trade go almost in the same level as drug trafficking in Central Asia. All this creates 
danger for stability in the region.Such vulnerable region was very dangerous especially for 
south part of Kyrgyzstan, particularly Osh. By means of various mafia clans or business 
monopolistic structures it was possible to influence situation in the region in a quite hard-
powered form. 
 
 
§ 4.3 Kurmanbek Bakiyev Takes Cabinet in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
In 2005 a Tulip Revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan and as a result was overthrewof 
Askar Akayev accused of the permanent governing Kyrgyzstan and assignment of money 
from the state budget. Parliamentary elections, which have passed on February 27 and on 
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March 13, 2005, were a reason and trigger of that revolution.
160
 As a result of these elections 
representatives of pro-governmental and neutral forces including children of president Askar 
Akayev occupied the majority of places in Parliament.
161
 
A new president - Kurmanbek Bakiyev - had to become a person of full contrast in 
compare to Akayev and to put Kyrgyzstan on a way of true democracy. With Bakiyev's 
coming to the power many Kyrgyz expected high economic growth and increasing of salaries 
and living standards; also many Kyrgyz enterprises had to be denationalized and transferred 
to private businessmen. In term of Kyrgyzstan‘s divide on North and South, this time victory 
was on the side of southerners.
162
 K. Bakiyev originally was from South that was again 
mentioned as alternating of the southerners and northerners in power. However, to soften 
skeptical moods of North concerning his presidency, Bakiyev appointed the prime minister a 
person from North of Kyrgyzstan - Felix Kulov, which was well known for his pro-Russian 
orientation.
163
Bakiyev also very soon began to be called aspro-Russian politician, because 
one fact drew public attention very much.  
 
While Askar Akayev tried to keep some balance in the territory of Kyrgyzstan in 
aspect of a hosting two bases - American and Russian, Bakiyev himself inclined a bowl of 
scales towards Russia. Akayev tried carring out a policy of balance of power, while Bakyev 
considered such situation very unacceptable for Kyrgyzstan and uncertain in term of 
priorities arrangement. 
 
Bakiyev's essential difference from Akayev was in opposite thoughts about 
Kyrgyzstan‘s multiethnicity: new president didn't pay due attention to this factor and didn't 
try to promote policy ofnational spirit rising among Kyrgyz population that was very diligent 
and carefully provided by Akayev.
164
 There were no posters- reminders that Kyrgyzstan was 
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a common home for all ethnicities living in it, no propaganda posters promoting cultural and 
spiritual heritage of Kyrgyz and campaigns inviting people for an occasion of national 
symbols or heroes anymore. Because all this was considered as a reminder of the previous 
president and therefore was cleaned out from the streets. Already exactly in a year after Tulip 
Revolution many Kyrgyz people were disappointed with its fruitsas their hopes weren't 
justified and the samesocial problems remained almost unsolved.
165
 Refusal of interior 
national policy by Bakiyev becomes a reason for discontent among nationalist politicians in 
Kyrgyz government. There was literally a split between it and other politicians in parliament. 
Also oil to fire added Bakiyev‘s protege and right hand - Felix Kulov, whom many Kyrgyz 
considered not corresponding person for a position of the prime minister. Once he made a 
statement that Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation could create something like 
confederation in order to strengthen the bilateral communications.
166
 In the Russian 
Federation Kulov‘s statement was apprehended very skeptical, at the same time in 
Kyrgyzstan it caused an indignation squall among a huge number of population. Such attitude 
toward Kyrgyz and Kyrzgyzstan‘s problems discredited reputation of both Bakiyev and 
Kulov in country.  
 
Became clear that Bakiyev wouldn‘t have second term if he doesn't try to make 
something, as what was going on really didn‘t benefit Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev explained this 
tendency only as political tricks of the West and different forces in Kyrgyzstan, indulging 
West and the USA. 
167
While Akayev seemed concerned about creating national or 
multicultural unity; Bakiyev focuses on strengthening his political power. The International 
Crisis Group contends ―parliamentary democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been hobbled‖ because 
―the president‘s team was motivated purely by the desire to concentrate power in its 
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hands.‖168Such ardent aspiration to keep in power was characteristic for both presidents, and 
if to analyze within the CIS, it was issue not only of Kyrgyzstan, but also of many other 
states too.  
Chapter V. Russia's Impact on Kyrgyzstan in 2010 
 
§ 5.1 Bakiyev's overthrow. 
 
―The authorities stepped up pressures on the opposition and independent media. 
Several independent editorial offices were closed in March and early April 2009, under the 
pretexts of slurring the presidency or using pirated software. Steps were taken to block online 
news services, instances of harassment and persecution of NGO and opposition activists were 
reported, and on 25 March the Parliament voted new laws making citizens‘ surveillance 
easier.‖ 169  It‘s a fragment about situation during the Bakiyev period in Kyrgyzstan and 
reasons of accruing discontent with him among the population. The more long the country 
was ruled by Bakiyev, the more Kyrgyzstan rolled down in totalitarianism and had decline of 
democratic values in the country. 
  
Ethnic fermentation had also began in country: Kyrgyz and Uzbeks began to separate 
from each other in all spheres of daily life and other ethnics also began to mark 
demonstratively their ethnic originality. Akayev‘s times of "Common Home" for all people 
living in Kyrgyzstan has passed long ago.
170
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Many experts claim that not rendering due consideration to a problem of ethnic 
minorities and their coexistence with Kyrgyz was one of Bakiyev's main internal mistakes.
171
 
However, the president very soon began to lose in the political sphere to the main global 
actors.Also rigid discontent among Kyrgyz people was caused by Bakiyev's tribalistic 
approach in domestic policy. Bakiev appointed many of his family members to key positions 
within his Government. 32-year-old Maxim, his younger son and head of Kyrgyzstan‘s 
Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation since October 2009, was 
widely detested.
172
Bakiyev has exactly repeated a way of his overthrown predecessor, though 
at the beginning of his presidency he promised to eradicate all shortcomings of Akayev‘s 
governmental system.It should be noted that as at the time of Akayev, so at the time of 
Bakiyev activity and work of mass media was rigidly regulated in the country as well. 
However, by estimates of many, during the period of presidency of the second one it became 
even more rigid.  
 
Actually, those freedoms, which the new president promised everyone in Kyrgyzstan 
weren't carried out. Any criticism was ripped in the bud, and journalists were accused of 
assistance to western political agencies. The Kyrgyz government had been blocking 
transmission of Radio Free Europe (Azattyk) and BBC radio, both of which had a broadcast 
range covering the entire country. The ban came at a time of a worsening energy crisis, 
rampant inflation, and mobilization by opposition movements, and general public 
disaffection with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev‘s government.173 
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Kyrgyz government censorship has been criticized by the Bishkek office of the 
OSCE, which has called on Bakiyev to veto the recent restrictive law on the mass media. In 
its 2009 report, Freedom House described Kyrgyzstan as a country with shrinking 
independence in the mass media and noted its absence of freedom of speech.
174
 It‘s possible 
to tell that all achievements in term of a democracy and freedom of speech, which at the 
beginning of independence broadly used by citizens of Kyrgyzstan, were almost nullified. 
Kyrgyzstan came back again to a form of an authoritative mode, though there were all 
rudiments for normal functioning of the purely parliamentary republic. 
 
The relations with the Kremlin began to worsen because of disagreements with 
Kyrgyz government about Manas air base. Bakiyev kept the promise and signed an 
agreement, which transformed base in the logistic Kyrgyz - American Center.
175
Upon 
replacing Akayev, Bakiyev quickly took over the complex network of base-related fuel and 
service contracts, but he also sought to increase the official $ 2 million rental payment for the 
base, given the base‘s obvious value to U.S. defense planners.176, 177 
 
However, this act it didn't satisfy the Russian government; moreover, it expressed 
concern about such situation. In the Kyrgyzstan the political situation became at that time 
extremely unstable: opinions of people concerning air base rented by the USA shared. But 
these actions of Bakiyev's didn't mean that he was going on rapprochement with the USA. He 
rather tried to continue policy of balance and deduction on the territory of Kyrgyzstan two 
bases: Kant and and Manas.At the beginning of April, 2010 people began to gather in crowds 
to hold meetings concerning discontent with Bakiyev‘s presidency.178 Generally, they were 
angry at social problems and clan policy provided by Bakiyev and his family. In Talas and 
Bishkek passed mass excitements, which thrown after on other cities and have shaken all 
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country. However, the rapid downfall of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev came as a 
surprise for political analysts. Only four days previously he met with UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon in Bishkek. Not a single analytical center in Russia or the West predicted such 
a rapid turn of events.
179
 
 
People told the different reasons, which have pushed people to revolt, but the main 
was poverty and absence of any work for young people. Increase of tariffs for electricity 
became a last straw. Last year the electricity costed 75 kopeks, since New Year tariffs rose 
twice. Nurse from protesting crows said: "I have a salary of 2000 rubles, for electricity I have 
to pay 80 rubles now, but it was 40 earlier!"
180
 There were masses of such people on streets: 
each of them had its own story about dissatisfaction with the government, and especially, 
with the President. It seems Bakiev did not learn from his predecessor, AskarAkaev, who was 
also toppled in March 2005 in what became known as the Tulip Revolution.
181
 
 
The fact of the begun disorders already demonstrated that events repeat again 
according to the same scenario of 2005. Collisions of oppositionists with police took place on 
April 7, 2010. Then protests turned into armed revolution during which supporters of 
opposition seized the capital of Bishkek and the main office buildings.
182
 
 
But the last straw was Bakiyev's statement about his desire to transfer the capital of 
Kyrgyzstan from Bishkek to the south of country:two cities were chosen for bidding - Osh 
and Jalal-Abad. Certainly, residents of Bishkek didn't want to give their city‘s status of 
capital to another cityso simply. As the politician was from the South, he assumed that having 
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secured with support of his regional countrymen,he‘d be able to hold the power.183But the 
non-return point for Bakiyev had already passed: the opposition gained strength, having 
secured with people‘s support. As Bakiyev actually didn't supervise situation in the country 
any more, opposition officials created by provisional government led by Rosa Otunbayeva.
184
 
Several times the provisional government addressed to Bakiyev with an appeal to sign the 
statement for addition. At last, seeing accruing chaos and being afraid for the safety of 
himself and his family members, Bakiyev held negotiations with opposition and on April 13 
and 15 and then resigned.
185, 186
 
 
 
§ 5.2 Destabilization of situation in Osh and riots. 
 
Kyrgyzstan endured the second revolution exactly in 5 years. For such short period 
political stresses were extremely undesirable for the country in which there were enough 
internal problems that were aggravated each time government changes. The provisional 
government realized that despite Bakiyev's departure to Kazakhstan and then to Belarus, 
passions within the country won't settle for a long time, because of citizens‘ anger for 
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Bakiyev‘s reforms.187 Preparation for new presidential elections and establishment of the 
functioning government for a while was the main objective of Rosa Otunbayeva‘s 
government. But the situation was very hard and shaky; tensions were increasing, as people 
were afraid that now someone worse than Bakiyev would come to power.  
 
 In problem regions of the country disorder and arbitrariness began despite existence 
of provisional government. Especially in poor southern regions of the country activation of 
monopoly and clan policy in social life of the population was clearly observed. The most 
unstable and restless areas of Kyrgyzstan in a difficult transition period became even worse. 
All underground enterprises became more active and even skirmishes between supporters and 
opponents of Bakiyev in the south continued to happen as well. In news chronicles of those 
days two cities, Osh and Jalal-Abad, flashed most of all. The situation in Osh became much 
complicated because of big population of Uzbek ethnic minority.
188
After Bakiyev's 
overthrow Kadyrzhan Batyrov has arrived again for supporting Uzbeks of Osh as considered 
them the most vulnerable in this situation.  
 
Many believe that just his arrival provoked new collisions of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, as 
Kyrgyz knew him as an armed separator.
189
Daniel Greenfield wrote in Eurasia Review that 
«leveraging Uzbek separatists like Kadyrjan Batyrov, Putin had managed to light the fuel 
dump of ethnic tensions that had already been simmering in Osh constantly».190Certainly, his 
arrival wasn't the only reason of newly escalated Osh protests, but its stay in Osh added oil in 
fire of the chaos, which has captured Kyrgyzstan in those months. The provisional 
government worked too slowly and didn't cope with the accruing tension in Osh.  
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Such scope of violence in Osh took the provisional government unawares, though 
some Uzbeks claimed that these riots occurred with the connivance of Kyrgyz 
authorities.
191
And fact of asking Russia‘s military help with approval from Collective 
Security Treaty Organization for regulation of situation byRosa Otunbayeva caused 
suspicions not only among Uzbeks, but Kyrgyz as well. Only when obvious armed conflicts 
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz began the provisional government sounded an alarm andentered 
a curfew.
192
 But it was late as in Osh has already bossed gangs attacking people and killing 
them.  
 
According to eyewitnesses, collisions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks started by a 
casino, located near the Alay Hotel, in the center of Osh in the evening on June 10.
193
Many 
people, having caught sight of huge crowd, just came out of their houses in order to learn 
what was happening. Various rumors and guesses began to spread all over Osh city. Non-
confirmed rumors and gossips played a huge role in situation forcing - in the next days mass 
violence, tortures, murders and rapes captured almost all Osh city. 
 
Rumors from both parties contradicted each other: Kyrgyz said that Uzbeks attacked 
them in order to force Kyrgyz not toenter Osh: they burn their houses, raped women, shot 
everyone in streets, blocked roads.
194
 The same unreasonable rumors were spread among 
Uzbeks; they considered that Kyrgyz want to squeeze out all Uzbeks from Osh and resort to 
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various above-mentioned methods. According to many eyewitnesses and researchers, it‘s still 
unclear how rumors could spread just for one night all over region and who were distributors 
of them.
195
 
 
Outraged by the violence, and concerned about relatives in the city, crowds of ethnic 
Kyrgyz from neighboring villages descended on Osh city. From early in the morning on June 
11, crowds of ethnic Kyrgyz from surrounding villages joined locals in Osh in looting and 
torching Uzbek shops and neighborhoods, and sometimes killing Uzbeks they encountered.
196
 
Uzbeks began to barricade in their houses, quarters and to expose the patrol gathered 
from volunteers. All this revolted Kyrgyz even more as Kyrgyz have considered that Uzbeks 
have no right to do such things living in Kyrgyz land. Disorders accepted mass and bloody 
character and cruelty was especially evident.
197,198
 
 
Barricaded Uzbeks were attacked not by simple Kyrgyz people with stones and sticks, 
but by men on tanks in camouflage. They had enough weapons and ammunition and, 
according to many eyewitnesses, they were mercenaries. Among them were snipers who 
accurately shot on the purposes.
199
 People in camouflage passed from one quarter to another 
and fired on defeat. Soon disorders were thrown on Jalal-Abad and happened there with the 
same intensity and by the same scenario as in Osh. 
 
The situation became critical when crowds of refugees from Oshleaving their homes 
in a hurry reached mountain Souleymane at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. A great crush began 
and many had fainted just there. Shots of those events even without any comments give a 
clearly picture of chaos and hopelessness of those days for residents of Osh.
200
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However, it‘s remarkable that many Kyrgyz of Osh despite flashed violence and the 
anti-Uzbek moods continued to help Uzbeks. Kyrgyz let them live in their houses, defended 
from gunmen, and gave money, food and medicaments. Many Uzbeks said that these riots 
were work of certain forces, including Kyrgyz,which just used Kyrgyz nationalism in this 
way. But these killings and persecutions of Uzbeks had nothing common with other 
Kyrgyz.
201
 Thus, despite Osh tension in 2010, which came like a ghost from the past 1990, 
there wasn‘t attitude towards Kyrgyz like a real enemy.  
 
But one thing has consolidated both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks: thisconflict and 
destabilization of situation within several days was very well conducted by someone, and 
maybe, even planned.
202
 Such thoughts of simple citizens found quite reasonable 
confirmation by some analysts. 
 
 
§ 5.3 “130 years of Russian Dominance”203 
 
The countries of Central Asia after the USSR‘s collapse continued to be more 
connected with Russia than with someone else. Even mutual cooperation between Central 
Asian states them hadn‘t level of the same cooperation and relationshipas it was with Russia. 
All this made Russia main actor in this region and held it leadership for a long time. It should 
be noted that boundless influence of Russia was spread over all countries, except Uzbekistan, 
that have borders with Afghanistan.
204
 
 
As a result, the American presence in the region and its influence rose from the South. 
But after well-known agreements considering air-base Manas influence of Russia even in 
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Kyrgyzstan became shaky. According to some analysts, states of region were almost "floating 
away" from under Russia‘s wing.205 It was necessary to try returning them. Therefore any 
occurred event in the region was immediately explained from Kremlin prism or just was 
connected with Russia‘s foreign policy. According to the listed above reasons it wasn‘t 
surprising, but even natural approach. So was with happened second Osh riots. Many experts 
right there noted that Russia could not stand apart from this mess. The only thing to do was to 
find out degree of Russia‘s involvement into a course of Osh conflict.206Some western 
journalists and analysts believed that the ethnic conflict, which took place in Osh, was 
interior structure. Nationalism used in a context of ethno-symbolism for the solution of some 
tasks of certain powers was a superstructure. There is a certain political picture appears if to 
combine all factors, which at least brought to Osh conflict.  
 
First, artificial borders of the modern five states of Central Asia, which were traced 
after collapse of Tsarist Russia without taking into account settlements of nations and ethnics 
in khanates, has already created a base for the further conflicts. It turned out that some people 
remained out of their natural borders of accommodation.
207
Also, in 1991 a new Central Asian 
state inherited the same state borders that were devised in the 1930s on the Stalinist principle 
of ―divide and rule.‖208Thus occurred very big Uzbek settlements in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz 
settlements in Kazakhstan, Uzbek settlements in Tajikistan and on the contrary and so on.  
 
During the Soviet Union it was restrained by one general communistic-totalitarian 
system and intrusion of idea of internationalism for the sake of bright future of all Soviet 
proletarians. Hard power as executions and references and some other methods of a 
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totalitarian mode were applied as well.
209
But already in the last years of Soviet empire‘s 
existing this factor detonated and ethnic riots began. 
 
The Osh conflict, which has flashed in 1990, has already indicated the intensity 
center. However, for young independent and getting nationalized states it was normal. 
Nationalism in many former Soviet republics has demonstrated the essential uniformity with 
nationalism in some developing countries.
210
The transition period could not be passable 
painless. 
 
Secondly, nationalism and its all manifestations played a big role in region. The risen 
wave of nationalism swept away literally everything on its way: glorification of one nation 
and belittling of the neighbour's nation.
211
 But by the end the 90
s
 situation more or less 
calmed down and became stable. But the abyss between some ethnics became not bigger, but 
just deeper. In a context of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan the risen nationalism literally faced 
foreheads in 20 years. Many political factors have showed why these riots occurred namely in 
20 years. The available latent nationalism and border disputes were like a trump in hands of 
those who could influence a situation. 
 
Thirdly, there were also personalities, which interests quite coincided with interests of 
the main actor. For example, Uzbek political figure Kadyrjan Batyrov. This made many 
analysts to accuse Kremlin policy of kindling the interethnic conflict.
212
 But everything was 
more difficult than seemed. Fourthly, the accruing nationalism in Kyrgyzstan could reach 
sooner or later the critical weight and stream on any other ethnos within the country. But 
because of internal political dismantling and revolutions it turned into a peculiar weapon 
against neighbors.At the same time politically inconvenient Bakiyev was not faithful to his 
pro-Russian position any more. But at the same time his overthrow was hardly planned by 
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other powers, though there are also opinions about it.
213
To win time and to affect elections of 
new government it was necessary to create turmoil in the territory of country.People like 
Uzbek nationalist leader Kadyrjan Batyrov were used to stage riots, and suppress counter-
riots, in order to remove Bakiyev from power, and replace him with Roza Otunbayeva.
214
 
 
―The U.N. has found evidence of bloody intent behind the chaos in Kyrgyzstan that 
killed hundreds. The declaration by the U.N. that the fighting was "orchestrated, targeted and 
well-planned" - set off by organized groups of gunmen in ski masks - bolsters government 
claims that hired attackers marauded through Osh, shooting at both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks to 
inflame old tensions.‖ 215 
 
One very remarkable fact is that Russia didn‘t seek moment to manage military 
intervention in Kyrgyzstan. It only has sent some troops for protection of the base Kant and 
Russian families living around it. For Russia‘s policy it could be an unpopular measure after 
war with Georgia in 2008.
216
 Also such intervention could obviously indicate its assistance 
both in coup and in the subsequent Osh conflict. 
  
 
§ 5.4 Connections between coup and Osh riots.  
 
Events in Osh showed that coincidence of several significant factors at once could 
play a role of trigger in starting bloody protests. The Osh conflict became continuation of the 
April disorders caused by removal of the president of Kurmanbek Bakiyev for many people 
in Kyrgyzstan. According to Anna Matveeva, June riots could be quite provoked by 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev's supporters which tried to return him toin this way.
217
 But how these 
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protests began in Osh, where mainly Uzbeks live, two months later. Tension in the relations 
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz was increasing during the period from April to March because 
of disagreements concerning the president of state. Uzbeks weren't satisfied with Bakiyev's 
presidency and were glad to see him overthrown, while Kyrgyz of the South were not happy 
with happened coup. Influence of April revolution on Osh riots could be observed through a 
prism of Kremlin policy. Russia played no direct role in Kyrgyzstan‘s violence in April and 
June of that year, the Kremlin was disenchanted enough with President Kurmanbek Bakiev 
and his government‘s policies to do something about it – particularly given the perceived 
duplicity over the American Manas ‗Transit Center‘, and the fact that Bakiev‘s son had 
control over the economy, giving him the ability to block Russian projects.
218, 219
 
 
Wide well-oranized campaign in the Russian mass media against Bakiyev could only 
only confirm readiness of Russia to overthrow an objectionable politician by means of soft 
power. ―In early 2010, Russian TV broadcasts in Kyrgyzstan and online news sites produced 
hard-hitting pieces about top-level corruption. These often truthful (if selective) exposés 
helped prepare the ground for Bakiev‘s end. Even before April, Russia had already raised the 
fuel duty on petrol it exported to Kyrgyzstan (in preparation for the latter‘s entry into the 
Customs Union, it claimed) and shut down some bilateral banking transactions, triggering 
social unrest.‖220 
 
The sudden increase in criticism also demonstrates how the Kremlin uses the national 
mass media to express its frustration with Bakiyev. Previously, Russian media outlets were 
galvanized to provide filtered reporting of issues relating to developments in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and other countries deemed as important to Russian foreign policy.
221
The situation 
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in Kyrgyzstan at that time was quite difficult not only in the political plan, but also in 
economic. It was not obligatory to an actor to use special force in order to change something 
in Kyrgyzstan. The situation could be compared with whiff towards a card-castle, which 
easily breaks up because of the slightest fluctuations of air. 
 
But what happened after April was not included into plans of Russia concerning 
deduction of Kyrgyzstan in loyal to Moscow situation. It seems like that if to consider 
geopolitical situation only in a sheaf Russia-Kyrgyzstan. But Osh riots were a collision of 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz territory. Uzbekistan also appeared in dependent on the 
main actor of Central Asia situation, as the card of protection of ethnic minority was 
played.K. Batyrov literally was givencard blanchein his hands during the riots.
222
According 
to materials, Uzbek separatists had enough weapons and were well armed to manage to bring 
turmoil in Osh in June 2010.
223
Even Uzbeks consider that he could not act so independently 
by himself.
224
 
 
 
§ 5.5 Ethno-symbolist approach in providing policy in Central Asia. 
 
Despite many factors, the source of second Osh conflict is democratic and economic 
condition, but not ethnic identity. While the ethnic approach is successful in the international 
level, the ethnic conflict will continue to happen.
225
These words reflect that each conflict 
which has occurred between two nations cannot be equated right there as an interethnic 
conflict. Other reasons of conflict origin come to surface while trying to understand the 
reasons and to study themdeeper. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks despite the available differences, in 
general, are representatives ofone part of ethnic symbolism as share common ethnic 
elements. Several reports stressed the essential similarity—ethnic, linguistic, cultural—
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between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations.
226
 Even considering hostility of Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz against each other in Osh region throughout long, disorders did not came out from 
interethnic roots. Two communities were not divided by irreconcilable hatred; barriers 
between them were caused by realities of a social categorization.Being tired out in their 
certain niches, they didn‘t see sense in building one common future. Cooperative 
communications were too fragile to resist to political crisis and to external powers.
227
 
 
Actually, the beginning of the Osh events was marked by terror of Bakiyev 
supporters, which tried to show discontent with his overthrown. But this statement still is 
causing mass of doubts. Giving to riots color of the interethnic conflict turned out quite easy 
and simply, as there was an Uzbek component. 
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Chapter VI.Presence of the USA, China and other regional states in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
§ 6.1 The USA’s reaction to events of 2010.  
 
―The United States has shown during the last two so-called revolutions in Kyrgyzstan 
– the one in 2005 and the one that just happened in April – that they would rather take a wait-
and-see approach. They have not come out strongly on the side of this provisional 
government; they did not come out so strongly on the side of Bakiev when he became 
president in 2005. Their interest is primarily in Manas for transporting goods to Afghanistan, 
and by taking one side or the other they risk the side they're on will lose, and if that happens, 
then they might lose the base.‖228 
 
These words truly characterized interests of the USA in Kyrgyzstan and gave an 
assessment of its inaction concerning Osh conflict. The main issue for America was to keep 
the presence in region by means of base Manas. Therefore, the USAhas chosen such 
approach to that riots: just towait for some time and look what will be farther. 
 
The USA didn‘t declare any special statements concerning Osh conflict. But there was 
a statement of the State Department release about providing humanitarian aid to a problem 
zone. ―The United States is deeply concerned and is closely monitoring developments in the 
Kyrgyz Republic and the affected border regions of Uzbekistan and supports international 
efforts to facilitate peace and order and the provision of humanitarian assistance coordinated 
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by the UN and other international organizations.‖229 The goal was to keep base Manas and 
with it to keep American presence in the region.  For starting negotiations it was necessary to 
be sure about political and ethnical stability in state.  
U.S Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake met with Roza Otunbayeva in Bishkek, 
the capital, on Saturday after touring several packed refugee camps in neighbouring 
Uzbekistan.
230
 In his speech he said, that the USA would support relief actionsfor people, 
which suffered from happened riots. Also Blake declared that―interim government should 
probe the violence and such an investigation should be complemented by an international 
investigation by a credible international body."
231
 
 
As Manas air base was close in 2009 it could be understandable that the USA don‘t 
want to have risks again in losing presence on Kyrgyzstan‘s territory. But this reason was not 
the only one why the USA was watching carefully situation in the region without actions. 
 
The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the US Kyrgyzstan then offered to host US forces at an airbase. The 
US military repaired and later upgraded the airfield for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, 
medical evacuation, and support for U.S. and coalition personnel.
232
 Kyrgyzstan borders with 
Uzbekistan, which in its turn borders with Afghanistan. This issue is not about political 
influence and presence, but regional and international security. Even sometimes Uzbekistan 
is called ―key to Afghan war drawdown‖ as it plays huge role in methods of solution of terror 
and drug trafficking problem in Afghanistan.
233
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But Central Asian region still have weak security system and preventing attacks of 
regional terrorist groups in states. At the heart of Central Asia‘s security crisis is the Fergana 
Valley. Since the late 1990s this region has been fervently contested by Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and has endured continuous armed clashes, led by the IMU 
through raids and terrorist attacks, including car bombings, full-scale village assaults and the 
kidnapping of foreigners.
234
 But in 2010 instability and violence reached Osh city and 
spontaneously extended on other cities. So, even interim government wasn‘t able to regulate 
situation in the country as the wished it to be controlled.  
 
It‘s quite possible, that the USA was waiting for Russia‘s actions during this period in 
order to choose its policy toward Kyrgyz authorities after according to generated situation. 
And again it was quite possible to draw some analogies of this situation with Georgian-
Russian war 2008, when the USA also refrained from any actions and just watched Russian‘ 
military reaction. Such approach was very favorable to the USA and helped it to avoid the 
direct pressure upon the state of conflict that is Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the USA just specified 
on humanitarian aid and financial support for Kyrgyzstan, as it was mentioned in its 
statement. 
 
These campaigns provided assistance to displaced and returning families and address 
the roots of the conflict through community development and conflict mitigation programs.
235
 
Thus, it‘s visible that America just stood a bit apart from other political issues in acting and 
providing policy of recognition of guilty and innocent in that conflict. Some experts consider 
that wait-and-see approach was chosen because of the US sure, that situation in region was 
well controlled by Russia authorities by the help of pro-Russian oriented officials of both 
countries: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
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Only when everything calmed down in Osh and came to a normal state, US officials 
renewed again the relations with Kyrgyzstan at former level. President Obama offered 
congratulations to the people and government of Kyrgyzstan for holding a ―democratic and 
peaceful‖ election and for taking ―an important and courageous step on the path of 
democracy".
236
 After 2011 the USA tried to establish more close economic relations with 
Kyrgyzstan, to help with development of infrastructure in problem regions, mostly in the 
South and to improve strong diplomatic relations with newly elected president Almazbek 
Atambayev. The future of base Manas will be reconsideragain in 2014.An old agreement 
signed by ex-president Bakiyev in 2009 just renamed air base in ―Manas Transit Center‖ for 
period of five years.
237
 
 
 
§ 6.2. Interrealtions with China 
 
Speaking about role of Russia and the USA in Central Asia it‘s impossible to ignore 
such actor of the region as China. China, which has no big political influence and pressure, 
just perfectly uses its economic superiority and plays this card in relationship with Central 
Asian states. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had quite close economic relations with China.  
 
China is Kyrgyzstan‘s second-largest trade partner (behind Russia; many of the 
Chinese exports are re-exported by Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian countries) and is an 
investor in some Kyrgyz industry and transport projects.
238
There is cheap laborof workers 
from China: construction of roads, bridges, repair works on hydroelectric stations, small 
business and trade. At higher level could be named owning of some Kyrgyz companies, 
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industries by Chinese businessman. China is recently working on a road from its Xinjiang 
Province to Osh.
239
As in political sphere there are a lot of common points between Russia 
and China, therefore Russia does not oppose to economic expansion of China in Central Asia. 
It should be noted that China is better presented in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
In political issues China always tried to adheregood neighborliness as it has potential 
disagreements with Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is a key component of Beijing's "go out" strategy 
towards Central Asia - and Eurasia in general.
240
 Two border crossings at the Irkestan and 
Torugart passes connect the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Kyrgyzstan.
241
 The 
biggest problem is still Uyghur issue; there are about 50 Uyghur living in Kyrgyzstan 
thousand. On the one hand, China and Kyrgyzstan recognizes integrity of each other 
territories and in every possible way sweep aside any separatist moods. On the other hand, 
growth of anti-Chinese moods in Kyrgyzstan pulls together some Kyrgyz with Uyghur. At 
times, Kyrgyz ultranationalists have attacked ethnic Chinese traders and others in 
Kyrgyzstan.
242China‘s economic ―expansion‖ in Kyrgyzstan has been overwhelming.Almost 
all consumer goods sold in Kyrgyzstan are imported from China.
243
Such skirmishes have 
household character, as waves of migration of Chinese to Kyrgyzstan are very huge. 
 
Potential threats to the Chinese-Kyrgyz relations remain only in the theory as neither 
China, nor Kyrgyzstan could be pleased with any deterioration of their partnership. China 
"feeds" with it investments Kyrgyzstan, which after revolution and the conflict in Osh 
appeared between two fires, that is Russia and the USA. China as well as other countries, 
directed the humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyz and Uzbeks after the Osh events.  
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The same policy is pursued in relation to Uzbekistan for which China is also the 
second biggest partner in terms of trade and economics.
244
 In the political plan Chinese 
authorities support very much Islam Karimov and his measures of revolts suppression. For 
example, in due time China not only didn‘t condemn bloody suppression of the Andijan riots, 
but also expressed the satisfaction with such governmental actions.
245
China managed to 
improve its relations with a regime that had previously shown reluctance towards developing 
deeper Chinese-Uzbek relations.
246
Therefore, there were no special statements on the Osh 
conflict; China preferred to stand aside in order not to break its economic relations with close 
partners. The Chinese exercise of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic tools in response to 
political developments in Central Asia indicates the importance it places on its western 
front.
247
 
 
 
§ 6.3 Other integration projects of the region. 
 
The regional leader and so-called chief in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. It also 
possesses championship in creation of various regional integration projects according to 
which all countries of Central Asia has to interact more closely practically in all regional 
issues. This initiative of Kazakhstan is an aspiration to play a role of unifier in the region in a 
counterbalance to other powers. It can be clearly tracked by reaction of Russian press to 
Kazakhstan's attempts of consolidation into one union all countries of the region.
248
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However, despite all attempts of Kazakhstan, centrifugal forces in the region are 
much stronger, than integration process as mostly all unions and organizations in Central 
Asia are under construction and influence of Moscow policy line.  
 
Turkey also has its own projects considering the Central Asian region. Turkey's policy 
is directed on integration of Turkic-speaking states for creation something like Turkic League 
or Union in future. The Turkish challenge is viewed as particularly serious because of the 
support to lie behind Ankara. Russian commentary frequently portrays Turkey as a 
―spearhead‖ of Western and NATO strategic influence.249 Such facts testifies by creation of 
Agency of Turkic cooperation and development (TIKA) for the purpose of coordination at 
the state level of all kinds of activity directed on a unification of Turkic people. The activity 
in the Central Asian region was stirred up by such Turkish organistaions as ―The Turkish 
international research center‖ of  Turan Yazgan, ―Avrasiya Bir‖ fund and ―Turksoy‖.250 In an 
asset of these organizations lies promotion of special Turkic model of development which is 
based on the values inherent to Turkic culture. In Kyrgyzstan this purpose is provided by the 
net of Turkish-Kyrgyz lyceums "Manas".
251
 
 
One of the the major directions of Turkish activity is training various profile 
professionals for working and living in Central Asian republics. It's possible to notice big 
aspiration of Turkey to influence on    situation in the region and provide its interests by 
means of soft power. Ankara annually allocates some thousand grants for training students 
and teachers from the Turkic-speaking republics in higher educational institutions and the 
research centers of Turkey. A Memorandum of Understanding in the fields of education and 
science between the Ministry of National Education of Turkey and the Ministry of Education 
and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic‖ was signed on May 6, 2008 in Kyrgyzstan in order to 
improve the relations of friendship and education. The education in Turkey of military 
personnel for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and rendering of the humanitarian and military and 
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technical aid are traditional.
252
 
 
 It should be noted about influence of an Islamic factor in the region. The Islamic 
organizations in every possible way try to extend their influence on the region and, thereby, 
to connect all Muslim states to one uniform Caliphate.
253
 Become well known in the region 
―Hizb Ut-Tahrir‖fundamental organization which generally bosses in the territory of 
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, but has strong supporters in Kyrgyzstan and other states of 
Central Asia adheres such provisions.  
 
However, despite all attempts of region states integration on the basis of a religious 
idea this ideologydoesn't find due number of the supporters.
254
 There was Islam with ethnic 
coloring and factor of regionalism throughout centuries on the territory of Central Asia.  
 
 Thus, it‘s visible that Russia being not the only actor in the region tries to work more 
actively in order not to lose former influence in each of the certainstates of Central Asia. In 
this plan Russia has one big advantage in compare with others: historically these territories 
were developing together with Russia and living under ideology that was provided by 
Russia.
255
 Therefore for Russian experts it is much easier and more convenient to calculate 
behavioral models of these or those politicians of Kyrgyzstan and to reveal levers of pressure 
upon their policy for achievement of needed purposes. 
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Сonclusion 
 
It should be noted from the very beginning that Osh conflict of 2010 was very 
ambiguous phenomena as a lot of information from various sources was extremely 
inconsistent and opposite. It's possible to allocate three versions considering Osh events: 
Russian or pro-Russian from regional Central Asian agencies, Western and local Kyrgyz or 
Uzbek, more often addressed for raising popularity of presidents. But separating wheat from 
chaff it become possible to come to a certain conclusion. Deep analyses of many facts help to 
draw in detail a whole picture of reasons, which brought to Russia‘s impact on Osh conflict. 
Division to South and North played a big role for Kyrgyzstan, therefore in Soviet period 
heads of governments were appointed serially from Moscow. Deduction of such secret 
section helped to agree easier with discordant of one of the sides: northern or southern.
256
 On 
the other hand, in South there was quite big settlement of Uzbeks, but it didn‘t play any 
special role at that time. With growth of nationalist sentiments both in Kyrgyzstan and in 
Uzbekistan tension between residents-representatives of the basic ethnic group and ethnic 
minoritiesincreased promptly. It‘sespecially necessary to emphasize that most of all 
nationalism wave was directed against Russians, especially in Kyrgyzstan in the 90s.
257
 Even 
the first Osh conflict by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz opinion was not interethnic, but social where 
apple of discord was land issues. The same was observed in other areas of Kyrgyzstan, 
mainly occupied by Kyrgyz, plus there was a problem with water resources. Even defilement 
of monuments to communists took place in some regions of the country. All this put Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz on one side of barricades at that time. 
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But Kyrgyz nationalism appeared more strongly and more radical. Russia, which was 
carefully watching Kyrgyzstan after 2001 when the USA has already fixed positions in 
Uzbekistan, tried to achieve from Kyrgyzstan as much loyalty as it was possible. But 
nationalism grewnot only among the population, but also among politicians who got to 
parliament and tried to create opposition in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, nationalist sentiments exuded 
in Kyrgyzstan from everywhere: from mass media, from Parliament and southern regions, 
which has hard economic situation. There wasn‘t obvious problem namely of Uzbek residents 
in Osh even despite these facts. Nothing reminded first Osh riots. 
After 2009 relationship between Kremlin and Kyrgyz authorities considerably 
worsened. The reason for that was that base Manas was still open for Americans. First of all, 
Russia saw in that threat for its base Kant and didn‘t want to reconcile with such situation in 
Kyrgyzstan. Also Russia began to doubt Bakiyev's devotion.Within the country people also 
were dissatisfied with Bakiyev. They were angryabout behavior of members of his family 
and increased corruption in the country.In Russian mass media massive anti-Bakiyevattack 
give chance for many people to believe that Kremlin prepared his overthrow in advance. 
There are no obvious proofs of it, but there are indirect evidences. Such step had to be 
justified by Russian foreign policy and useful for it. But if to consider that here one stone 
killed two birds, then it‘s clear why this step was chosen. 
 
Accruing Kyrgyz nationalism was easy to use not only for Bakiyev's overthrow, but 
also in aspect of relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan began to move 
away too, as felt domination in the region in fight against terrorism with the help of 
US.
258
Many Uzbek politicians were connected with Osh, therefore overthrow of Bakiyev, 
which was very painful for southerners of Kyrgyzstan would inevitably affect Uzbeks as 
well. Nobody else could know and count such changes in situation as well as it could do main 
actor in Central Asia for centuries.  It is undoubted that in such situation a new approach 
come to a political arena and began to be used. Ethno-symbolism in such circumstances 
should play a role of sophisticated divider. After revolution of 2010 division to North and 
South went much deeper than it was ever;at the same time in South residents of Osh were 
divided into Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in very brutal way. The old classical Stalinistic scheme just 
got a new refined look. 
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It‘s impossible to say that third side provoked all things. In such a case an actor would 
act directly, especially, Russia thatused to enter troops almost immediately. Here conditions 
developed in such way that to bring an escalation to situation was not about big efforts. After 
April riots Osh Uzbeks became more active in political plan and started demanding 
autonomy. They had also leader, who earlier led ―Vatan‖ party in Uzbekistan. This party 
considered being oppositional. So, with the help of Kadyrjan Batyrov and Inomjan 
Abdurasulov it becomes possible to play card of nationalistic feelings in a problem southern 
region. Many experts are sure that mentioned above people had a certain financial feed from 
Moscow for implementation of such plans.Russian foreign policy found at once a number of 
benefits. 1) Bakiyev's elimination from power and by that elimination liquidation Bakiyev-
USA authorities relations 2) help to Uzbek separatists as a signal for the authorities of 
Uzbekistan 3) control in a conflict zone, that is Osh, by means of the entered military troops 
for protection of Russian military families living in Kyrgyzstan.
259
 Osh, despiteits location in 
Kyrgyzstan, directly affected Uzbekistan. There were rumors that Uzbekistan is even going 
to enter troops in Osh and Jalal-Abad in order to protect Uzbek minority from violence and 
punishment. Uzbekistan considered that Interim Government didn‘t hurry to interfere to a 
critical situation in South. Also many Uzbeks were against Russian troops entering Osh as 
considered these riots to be only interior issue of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.  
 
The fact that also played a big role in violence was that Osh being quite poor 
regionhad well-controlled transit drug trafficking paths. Mercenaries for provocations and 
violence were easy to be found from the criminal mafias and smugglers. Locals said that 
faces of many gunmen during Osh massacre were completely closed by masks.Many locals 
claim that those people wereBakiyev's supporters and they come back to have revenge for 
coup. Uzbeks were dissatisfied with Bakiyev's presidency and therefore immediately started 
organizing movement for autonomy in the period of governmental vacuum. Too fast for a 
short period to organize such movement and put demands in front of Kyrgyz. Uzbeks speak 
about that moment a lot. Many openly declare that they have no such thoughts about 
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demanding from Kyrgyz independence or more rights.
260
 They said that for long time of 
living side-by-side many Kyrgyz and Uzbeks managed become related. 
 
Thus, impact on Osh conflict 2010 from outside was not obvious and direct, but 
indirect according to many factors. First, there were certain problems of residents with 
employment and water resources. Secondly, nationalism reached its peak. Thirdly, it was 
already second coup in 5 years that created instability in such region and generated 
governmental vacuum. A mass of discontent and anger reached its critical point in 
Kyrgyzstan. Only some slightest movements were enough to trigger conflict. 
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